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Chapter 1: Introduction
The Puzzle
During the summer of 1925, Americans paid close attention as religious and secular
forces battled in a Dayton, Tennessee courtroom. In what Edward Larson calls in his Pulitzer
Prize winning Summer for the Gods “the most famous scene in American legal history,” the
aging politician, three-time presidential nominee, and fervent evangelical Protestant William
Jennings Bryan argued against the noted litigator Clarence Darrow – according to Larson,
America’s greatest criminal defense attorney. At hand was whether high school biology teacher
John Scopes had violated Tennessee’s new Butler Act (passed in the spring of 1925), which
outlawed teaching evolutionary theory in public schools.1 The simple legal question came to
represent a far greater and more controversial problem in American society: modern evolutionary
science seemed to disprove literal biblical interpretation. As Larson points out, not only did
“most fundamentalists reject evolutionary theory as contrary to a literal reading of the Bible,” but
also were troubled by the implications of random variation and natural selection.2 Perhaps for the
first time in America, there was an apparent and visible contradiction between science and
religion. It seemed to many that there was no answer.
This conflict was outwardly apparent in the trial itself, which was nothing short of a
circus. To accommodate the hordes of reporters and churchgoers that came to Dayton, the
arguments moved to the courthouse lawn. It became clear that Darrow’s strategy was to push
Bryan to admit that he – the biblical literalist – in fact engaged in interpreting Scripture, thereby

1

Edward J. Larson, Summer for the Gods: The Scopes Trial and America's Continuing Debate Over Science and
Religion (New York: BasicBooks, 1997). 3-8, 85-97.
2
Ibid., 25.
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proving that evolutionary theory was simply an alternate biblical interpretation.3 With Bryan on
the witness stand, Darrow pressed Bryan into a corner on the terrestrial geology, physics, and
timing of Genesis. Through the objections of his colleagues on the prosecution that the questions
had nothing to do with evolutionary teaching, Bryan was defiant:
Bryan: They [the defense] came to try revealed religion. I am here to defend it, and they
can ask me any question they please. [The crowd thundered in applause.]
Darrow: Great applause from the bleachers.
Bryan: From those who you call “yokels.” Those are the people whom you insult.
Darrow: [Shouting] You insult every man of science and learning in the world because
he does not believe in your fool religion.4
Darrow continued the interrogation. Although Bryan never explicitly admitted to engaging in
biblical interpretation, the point was made. Convinced that he had “won the intellectual
argument,” Darrow conceded the case – there was little doubt that Scopes did indeed violate the
Butler Act.5 Moreover, according to political scientist James Morone, the point was not to win in
Dayton but rather to get to the Supreme Court, where Darrow could create an even bigger
controversy by arguing that all state laws prohibiting the teaching of evolution in public schools
were unconstitutional.6 However, the case never got there. On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme
Court reversed the decision on a technicality, stopping “Darrow and the liberals” from reaching
the nation’s high court.7

3

James A. Morone, Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2003). 336.
4
The transcript of the Trial is printed in The World's Most Famous Court Case: Tennessee Evolution Case,
(Dayton: Bryan College, 1990). As cited in Larson, Summer for the Gods: The Scopes Trial and America's
Continuing Debate Over Science and Religion: 5.
5
Morone, Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History: 336.
6
At the time of the trial, Tennessee was one of three states (the others being Mississippi and Arkansas) in which
teaching evolution was a crime. By the end of the 1920s, however, 23 state legislatures had debated legislation to
outlaw evolutionary teaching.
7
Morone, Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History: 337.
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The outcome of the trial was telling. Although Darrow lost the battle, most scholars
contend that Bryan and his evangelical brethren lost the war.8 They were portrayed harshly in the
liberal media – as a disorganized, extremist, anti-intellectual Protestant sect. Perhaps most
notably, the journalist H.L. Mencken ridiculed Bryan and the antievolutionists in a series of
editorials in the Baltimore Evening Sun that were widely reprinted.9 For example:
The Scopes trial, from the start, has been carried on in a manner exactly fitted to the antievolution law and the simian imbecility under it. There hasn't been the slightest pretense
to decorum. The rustic judge, a candidate for re-election, has postured the yokels like a
clown in a ten-cent side show, and almost every word he has uttered has been an
undisguised appeal to their prejudices and superstitions. The chief prosecuting attorney,
beginning like a competent lawyer and a man of self-respect, ended like a convert at a
Billy Sunday revival. It fell to him, finally, to make a clear and astounding statement of
theory of justice prevailing under fundamentalism. What he said, in brief, was that a man
accused of infidelity had no rights whatever under Tennessee law.10
Consequently, evangelicals retracted from the public spotlight. As historian George Marsden
explains, “Very quickly, the conspicuous reality of the movement seemed to conform to the
image thus imprinted and the strength of the movement in the centers of national life waned
precipitously.”11 The fallout had lasting effects on conservative evangelicals, and it was not until
the latter half of the 20th century that evangelicals widely returned to the political mainstream.12

8

This was the opinion of most intellectuals of the day. However, because there is no polling data available, what
mainstream America thought of the trial is largely a mystery. It is notable, however, that most Americans were
probably more sympathetic to the creationists – as most Americans during the early 20th century were creationists
themselves – than the liberal-minded media.
9
Edward J. Larson, Trial and Error: The American Controversy Over Creation and Evolution (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2003). 72. The editorials of H.L. Mencken are reprinted in D-Days at Daytona: Reflections on the
Scopes Trial, ed. Jerry D Tomkins (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965). 35-51.
10
H.L. Mencken, "Battle Now Over, Mencken Sees; Genesis Triumphant and Ready for New Jousts," The
Baltimore Evening Sun, July 18, 1925. As cited in D-Days at Daytona: Reflections on the Scopes Trial. See also
Douglas O. Linder, "The 'Monkey Trial': A Reporter's Account," University of Missouri-Kansas City School of
Law, http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/scopes/menk.htm.
11
George M. Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 185.
12
Larson, Summer for the Gods: The Scopes Trial and America's Continuing Debate Over Science and Religion:
223. It is important to note that some evangelicals mobilized in support of anticommunist groups during the 1950s,
but this mobilization, although symbolic, was not substantial in the number of evangelicals it attracted.
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It is from this point in American religious and political history that I begin an analysis of the
dynamics of white evangelical political behavior.
The debate between creationism and evolution rages on today. I do not endeavor to
comment further on the trial itself, its legal implications, or the conflict more generally. Rather, I
begin the analysis with the Scopes trial for two central reasons. First, it thrust evangelicals into
the national limelight and prompted discussion of a “clash of two worlds.”13 Indeed, political
scientists have gone as far as to call the Scopes trial the “classic confrontation between tradition
and modernity.”14 While evangelicalism has been a distinct characteristic of American
Protestantism since the Founding, evangelicals tended to shy away from the political spotlight
prior to the early 20th century. Although the group returned to relative political dormancy after
the conclusion of the trial, evangelicals later politicized to some extent during the 1950s and
again significantly more widely in the 1970s. Thus, the trial, the debates it prompted, and the
cultural cleavages it revealed foreshadowed contemporary political battles between evangelicals
and secularists.
Secondly, the Scopes trial – and more specifically the role of William Jennings Bryan
therein – serves as an ideal starting point because it provides a noteworthy counterpoint to the
contemporary popular association between white evangelicals and political, social, and fiscal
conservatism. Bryan was a successful politician who applied morality, grounded in conservative
evangelicalism, to politics. This, by itself, is not likely to be surprising to contemporary political
observers – many of today’s self-identified evangelical politicians frequently invoke God and the

13

Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture: 187.
David C. Leege et al., The Politics of Cultural Differences: Social Change and Voter Mobilization Strategies in
the Post-New Deal Period (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002). 36.
14

4

role of the Church in their lives.15 However, Bryan differed in the political positions and
ideologies he advocated. Specifically, Bryan’s commitment to conservative theology did not get
in the way of his positioning as an ideological liberal and an economic populist who championed
the poor, fiercely criticized big business, and condemned America’s involvement in war. In the
words of biographer Michael Kazin, Bryan was very much a “Christian liberal,” and it was not
until later that people saw reason to “separate Bryan the orthodox Christian from Bryan the
fearless reformer.”16 According to Robert Putnam and David Campbell in their influential
volume on religion and American politics, “No politician in American history better exemplifies
the ideological malleability in the connections that can be drawn between religion and politics
[than Bryan].”17 This “ideological malleability” is evident in the political transformation of white
evangelicals in the 20th century.
Contemporary white evangelicals tend to be consistent conservatives – culturally,
socially, and fiscally.18 This contrasts with Bryan’s ideological commitment to fiscal and foreign
policy liberalism. Indeed, Bryan is perhaps most remembered for delivering the “Cross of Gold”
speech at the 1896 Democratic National Convention. The speech not only propelled Bryan into
contention for the Democratic nomination, which two days later he won, but also exemplifies
Bryan’s brand of economic populism. This ideology is further evident in Bryan’s stance as an
15

Most recently, George W. Bush won the 2000 and 2004 elections as a self-identified “born-again” evangelical
Protestant. Also, there are numerous conservative white evangelicals currently serving in Congress. See, for
example, Kenneth D. Wald and Allison Calhoun-Brown, Religion and Politics in the United States, 6th ed.
(Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011). 224-25.
16
Michael Kazin, A Godly Hero: The Life of William Jennings Bryan (New York: Knopf, 2006). 300. See also
Clyde Wilcox, Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics (Boulder, Colo.: Westview
Press, 1996). 25-34. Larson, Summer for the Gods: The Scopes Trial and America's Continuing Debate Over
Science and Religion: 12-32.
17
Robert D. Putnam and David E. Campbell, American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 2010). 416.
18
See, for example, Patrick Allitt, Religion in America Since 1945: A history (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2003). 154-59; Nancy Tatom Ammerman, "North American Protestant Fundamentalism," in
Fundamentalisms Observed, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appelby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1991), 45-47.
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enemy of big business, as an advocate for unskilled labor, and later as a “trust-buster.”19 More
importantly, it was not just Bryan – liberal preferences on economic issues were common among
Protestants, especially those with evangelical tendencies, during the early 20th century.20
Indeed, as Putnam and Campbell make clear, “Many radical Populists raging against
inequality were fervent evangelical Protestants.”21 The Fundamentals of Faith – a series of
pamphlets published between 1910 and 1915 largely credited with beginning the Christian
fundamentalist movement in America – contained an essay asserting that the “genuine Christian
profession was compatible with personal advocacy of socialism.”22 More generally, there was a
clear link between the primarily evangelical Social Gospel and populist politics existing before
Bryan came to political prominence and continuing after his death.23 According to Morone, at the
turn of the century, “The Social Gospel pushed Christian duty toward public service rather than
personal salvation … Believers denounced economic exploitation and cutthroat capitalism.”24
Evangelical organizations at the turn of the 20th century echo this sentiment; for example, the
Salvation Army considered the primary social evil to be the unequal and unjust distribution of
wealth.25 This ideology later turned into support for wide scale progressive politics, and the
southern white evangelical roots of the Social Gospel turned into mass support of New Deal

19

Richard Franklin Bensel, Passion and Preferences: William Jennings Bryan and the 1896 Democratic National
Convention (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 1-6, 305-08. See also Kazin, A Godly Hero: The Life
of William Jennings Bryan.
20
John P. Bartkowski and Helen A. Regis, Charitable Choices: Religion, Race, and Poverty in the Post Welfare
Era (New York: New York University Press, 2003). 102-20. See also Michael P. Young, Bearing Witness Against
Sin: The Evangelical Birth of the American Social Movement (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).
21
Putnam and Campbell, American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us: 251.
22
Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture: 120.
23
Frank Lambert, Religion in American Politics: A Short history (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 94103. See also James Davison Hunter, Evangelicalism: The Coming Generation (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1987). 22.
24
Morone, Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History: 220. See also Norris Manguson, Salvation in
the Slums: Evangelical Social Work, 1865-1920 (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow, 1977). 30-39.
25
Putnam and Campbell, American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us: 251.
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initiatives.26 Evidently, there was a strong tradition of white evangelicals advocating social
equality and redistributive policies dating to the early 20th century and lasting through the New
Deal. As a prominent evangelical leader of the late 19th and early 20th centuries who embodied
the religious and political perspectives of white evangelicals of the day (and at least one
generation after), Bryan and his many followers differ sharply from their contemporary religious
brethren. While the religious preferences of white evangelicals have changed little in the last
century, the group’s partisan and fiscal policy/social welfare preferences have changed
dramatically. I seek to explain this transformation.
A historical analysis of white evangelical political behavior is especially interesting in
light of the assumed “symbiosis” between white evangelicals today and the Republican Party. As
socio-moral/socio-cultural (“social”) issues have penetrated American politics since the 1960s,
white evangelicals have become both politically active and Republican Party constituents. The
contemporary GOP has become the socially (morally, culturally, sexually27) conservative party,
and, consequently, the preferred party of white evangelicals. As the “God gap” has become a
preeminent fixture of American political discourse, many Republican candidates have adopted a
religious “brand label.”28 Observing this “branding” of the GOP raises questions pertaining to
why some American religious groups are consistently affiliated with a political party (such as
contemporary white evangelicals with the GOP) but others are not (for example, Catholics.)
More generally, it is unclear what conservative theology has to do with conservative politics,
26

Robert P. Swierenga, "Religion and Voting Behavior, 1830s to 1930s," in The Oxford Handbook of Religion and
American Politics, ed. Corwin E. Smidt, Lyman A. Kellstedt, and James L. Guth (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2009), 84.
27
Throughout this paper, I refer to “sexual liberalism/conservatism.” By “sexually liberal” or “sexually
conservative,” I refer to liberal/conservative positions on most issues pertaining to sex, sexuality, and the family.
This list includes but is not limited to: abortion, contraception, the ERA, family policy, homosexuality, and
pornography.
28
David E. Campbell, Geoffrey C. Layman, and John C. Green, "A Jump to the Right, A Step to the Left: Religion
and Public Opinion," in New Directions in Public Opinion, ed. Adam J. Berinsky (New York: Routledge, 2011),
173.
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especially given the historical legacy of William Jennings Bryan. Chapter 2 analyzes how white
evangelicals became politically active, and Chapter 3 considers how the politicized group largely
became Republicans. In studying these political phenomena, effects of partisan affiliation on
group opinion become apparent. I observed that the commonly cited link between religious and
social conservatism could be intuitively explained by white evangelical biblical literalism and
moral traditionalism. However, as an important group in American elections and party politics,
contemporary white evangelicals are multidimensional political actors – they advocate policy
positions on a wide range of issues. In contrast to white evangelical preferences on social issues,
the contexts in which religious conservatism translates to fiscal conservatism are less intuitively
explained (or not at all). This is echoed in the figure of Bryan and what Putnam and Campbell
(cited above) call ideological malleability. From a fiscal policy perspective, white evangelicals in
the 20th century began with Bryan, the economic populist and monetary liberal, and over time
moved towards the GOP status quo – for example, low taxes, a minimal welfare state, and small
government. I treat these questions in Chapter 4, and propose a party affiliation effect in
explaining white evangelical fiscal conservatism.

The Basis of the Study: Who is an Evangelical?
I follow Marsden’s description in using “evangelical”:
Evangelical is broadly defined to include those in traditions that emphasize the Bible as
the highest religious authority, the necessity of being “born-again” or regenerated through
the atoning work of Christ on the cross, pietistic morals, and the necessity of sharing the
Gospel through evangelism and missions.29
Similarly, religion in politics scholar Robert Booth Fowler provides three theological
characteristics unique to evangelicals. First, all evangelicals believe in the universal sinfulness of
29

Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture: 235.
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man – all people are born sinners – as well as the necessity of a born-again experience. Second,
as articulated by Mardsen, all evangelicals affirm the truth of Scripture. Although there are
denominational differences in specific interpretations, all evangelicals agree upon the necessity
of literal interpretation.30 Thirdly, evangelicals interpret Scripture to command them to spread
the word.31 Thus, between Mardsen and Fowler it is possible to begin to understand the
theological characteristics of contemporary American evangelical Protestantism. Additionally,
evangelicals are distinct in their view of the end of time. Evangelicals tend to be strict
premillennialists – people who believe in the fact of the Second Coming, and that Jesus Christ
will “personally and bodily” return to earth to defeat evil.32 This is theologically distinct from
mainline Protestants, who tend to hold more liberal views of the end of time.
Less technically, most evangelicals believe that they engage in direct communication
with God. In a recent study, social anthropologist T.M. Luhrmann explores this relationship in
detail. Luhrmann explains that one of the key characteristics of evangelicalism, in addition to
biblical literalism, the born-again experience, and the necessity of spreading the Gospel, is that
evangelicals tend to believe in a literal and ongoing conversation with God. The most drastic
examples of this are “speaking in tongues,” a method of direct communication with God mainly
practiced by Pentecostals, and supernatural healing, in which a pastor calls upon the Holy Spirit

30

It is important not to discount denominational differences between evangelical sects as a complicating factor in
defining who is an evangelical. See below discussion.
31
Robert Booth Fowler, A New Engagement: Evangelical Political Thought, 1966-1976 (Grand Rapids, Mich.:
Eerdmans, 1982). 2-4. Religion in politics scholar John Green offers a similar treatment, providing four tenants of
evangelical belief: “One belief is that the Bible is inerrant. It was without error in all of its claims about the nature of
the world and the nature of God. A second belief is that the only way to salvation is through belief in Jesus Christ. A
third belief, and one that is most well known, is the idea that individuals must accept salvation for themselves. They
must become converted. Sometimes that's referred to as a born-again experience, sometimes a little different
language. Then the fourth cardinal belief of evangelicals is the need to proselytize, or in their case, to spread the
evangel, to evangelize.” See John C. Green and Raney Aronson, "Interview with John C. Green," PBS Frontline,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/jesus/interviews/green.html.
32
Joel A. Carpenter, Revive Us Again: The Reawakening of American Fundamentalism (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1997). 247-48.
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to heal, for example, back pain. Less dramatic examples include interactions with the divine
spirit in daily, mundane activities, as described by the noted evangelical pastor Rick Warren in
his recent book, The Purpose Driven Life. 33 These interactions tend to define evangelical life,
and are important to keep in mind when considering evangelical theology.
Yet, there are several complications in using “evangelical.” To begin with, it is important
to understand the difference between the terms “fundamentalist” and “evangelical.” Although the
two words connote essentially the same thing – biblical literalism, the necessity of being bornagain and spreading the Gospel, and the universal sinfulness of man – some scholars differentiate
them. Generally, “fundamentalist” implies a greater militancy of views than “evangelical,” as
well as a narrower understanding of conversion (the born-again experience, which most
fundamentalists see as a specific event in time whereas some evangelicals see as a transition over
time) and a dispensational view of time.34 In short, all fundamentalists are evangelicals, but some
evangelicals may not be fundamentalists, though the differences between the two terms are
nuanced, stylistic, and generally small.35
A further complication arises in that the definition of evangelical has changed over time.
While most Protestants who arrived in America during the 17th and 18th centuries likely
considered themselves evangelicals, today the term implies a more fundamentalistic brand of
Protestantism. Marsden traces the concept of evangelical Protestantism from the 19th century to
today, noting four time periods in which the connotation of “evangelical” has changed.
33

T. M. Luhrmann, When God Talks Back: Understanding the American Evangelical Relationship With God (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012). 14-15. The Purpose Driven Life has sold more copies than any other book in
America except the Bible. See Chapter 5 for an additional discussion of Warren.
34
Dispensational refers to a particular understanding of “sacred time” in which God’s activity is divided up into
several dispensations, or eras. Adherents believe that a new dispensation will begin with Christ returns to earth.
There is some disagreement in the literature as to the degree to which evangelicals adhere to the dispensational view
of time – although evangelicals are quite serious about the bodily return of Christ to Earth, not all evangelicals
follow a dispensational interpretation of time.
35
Green and Aronson, "Interview with John C. Green".
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Table 1.136
1. 19th Century – Evangelicalism: Most major Protestant denominations and also newer
revivalist groups. By the end of the century, American evangelicalism began to polarize
into theological liberals and conservatives37
2. 1920s – Fundamentalism: Conservative Protestants began to be called
“fundamentalists” (or “Christian fundamentalists”) at least in part as a result of the
Scopes Trial. The term connoted a militant opposition to modernism in both churches and
cultural values.
3. 1950s to mid-1970s – New Evangelicalism: Also referred to as evangelicals, New
Evangelicals were generally Protestants with a fundamentalist heritage who advocated for
the “positive evangelicalism” best exemplified by Billy Graham. This meant theological
conservatism and biblical literalism. Theologically similar to Fundamentalistic
Evangelicals, New Evangelicals were not widely politically active and mostly
nonpartisan.
4. Late 1970s to Present – Fundamentalistic Evangelicalism: Like New Evangelicals,
Fundamentalistic Evangelicals are also referred to as evangelicals. Fundamentalistic
Evangelicals are theologically conservative and morally absolute, but differ from New
Evangelicals in their tendency to be politically active.
These explanations are adapted in Table 1.1. Although the connotation of the term evangelical
has evolved over time, there is little doubt of the distinguishing characteristics of evangelicals.
However, a more nuanced treatment would additionally note the denominational differences
between evangelical and mainline sects. See Table 1.2. Yet like theology, denominationalism is
imperfect in identifying evangelicals. Although many denominations are by definition
evangelical, it is impossible to judge the extent to which individual adherents exhibit evangelical
tendencies. For example, the Southern Baptist Convention is the largest evangelical
denomination in the US, but it would be impossible to measure the degree to which each
Southern Baptist church member adheres to evangelical doctrine.

36

Adapted from Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture: 234-35.
See Wuthnow for an explanation of this intra-denominational polarization. Robert Wuthnow, The Restructuring
of American Religion: Society and Faith Since World War II (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988).
134-38.
37
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Table 1.238
White Evangelical
Southern Baptist Convention
American Baptist Churches*
Baptist General Conference
Christian and Missionary Alliance
Church of the Nazarene
Free Methodist Church
Salvation Army
Missouri Synod
Nondenominational Evangelical
Pentecostal Assemblies of God
Pentecostal Church of God
Christian Reformed Church
Seventh Day Adventist
Evangelical Free Church
Plymouth Brethren

White Mainline
Episcopal Church
United Church of Christ
Lutheran Church
United Methodist Church
Presbyterian Church
Reformed Church
Christian Church
Disciples of Christ
Congregational Christian

*American Baptist Churches can be either evangelical or mainline depending on location and specific congregation.
Furthermore, analogous to the theological and denominational differences between
evangelical and mainline Protestants, white and black evangelicalism exist as theologically
separate Protestant sects. A key question arises in considering the political history of black
evangelicals, who are largely Democratic Party constituents and exhibit liberal preferences on
some social issues and many fiscal issues.39 If the role of issues or strategic politicians is at least
part of the explanation of evangelical political activity and partisan preferences, why black
evangelicals do not exhibit the same policy preferences as white evangelicals is unclear. In
answering this question, the literature suggests that black evangelicalism should be considered a
38

Major evangelical and mainline denominations adapted from Lyman A. Kellstedt and John C. Green, "Knowing
God's Many People: Denominational Preference and Political Behavior," in Rediscovering the Religious Factor in
American Politics ed. David C. Leege and Lyman A. Kellstedt (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 70-71. For a
more comprehensive list of evangelical and mainline denominations, see Religious Congregations & Membership
Study, 2010, found at http://www.thearda.com/rcms2010/evangelical.asp and
http://www.thearda.com/rcms2010/mainline.asp.
39
See, for example, Clyde Wilcox and Carin Robinson, Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in
American Politics, 4th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2011). 68-69. Although black evangelicals are somewhat
socially liberal, they are notably conservative on homosexual rights and gay marriage.
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distinct religious tradition from white evangelicalism. This accounts for the differences in
political preferences. As political scientists Wilcox and Robinson explain, “Although African
Americans and whites read from the same Bible, the meaning of the text is socially constructed
in different ways in the two traditions.”40 As a result, I exclude black evangelicals from the
analysis.

The Christian Right
As a study of white evangelical political behavior and public opinion, I largely omit
analysis of the movement known in media circles as the Christian Right, New Christian Right, or
Religious Right. By definition, the Christian Right is a movement of connected, primarily white
evangelical, organizations that work to lobby the government, raise money, and advocate
positions on specific political causes. See Table 1.3 for a non-exhaustive list of contemporary
Christian Right organizations and a short description of their purpose or method. A large
literature exists on the Christian Right, its foundations, and the degree to which it has influenced
contemporary politics.41 Although I draw on much of this literature, my project is grounded in
white evangelical public opinion. Thus to the extent that the Christian Right influenced white
evangelical public opinion it is included in the analysis; however, I do not purport to examine the
Christian Right as a movement or its influence on American politics.
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Table 1.342
Organization
American Family Association
American Coalition for Traditional
Values
Christian Coalition of America
Citizens for Excellence in Education
Concerned Women for America
Eagle Forum
Family Research Council
Focus on the Family
Traditional Values Coalition

Purpose/Method
Fights obscenity in the mass media
Establishes traditional values in American
institutions
Lobbies conservative positions on social issues
Supports evangelicals in school board elections
Opposes gay rights legislation
Fights secularism in education
Lobbies for "traditional" families
Offers evangelical perspective on family matters
Advocates traditionalist positions on social
issues

Data and Methodology
The data used for this study comes from both the American National Election Studies
(ANES), administered jointly by Stanford University and the University of Michigan, and the
General Social Survey (GSS) administered by the National Opinion Research Center at the
University of Chicago. The National Science Foundation funds both the ANES and the GSS. The
ANES has provided survey data, generally every other year, since 1948 while the GSS has been
delivering survey data yearly since 1972. Both the ANES and GSS include a set of basic core
questions that are asked in every survey year. In both cases, these include race, gender, region,
religion, work status, income, political affiliation, and other general questions. In addition, both
the ANES and GSS ask questions specific to political and/or social issues that may come up in
one survey or be asked over several surveys. These generally have to do with presidential and
congressional approval (ANES), salient issues (for example, the ERA during the 1970s, on both
ANES and GSS), and others such as feeling thermometers of different groups or, for example,

42

Information taken from the organization’s websites and Glenn H. Utter and John W. Storey, The Religious Right:
A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 1995). 110-37. For a more comprehensive list, see ibid.

14

social class identification. Wordings of survey questions presented in this paper appear in the
appendix.
The first and most problematic issue in using survey data to assess white evangelical
opinion is the difficulty in distinguishing between evangelical and mainline Protestants. Due to
reporting differences between the ANES and GSS, I use different methods to distinguish
evangelicals in the two data sets. Using ANES data, I define evangelical denominationally
following the framework proposed by political scientists Kellstedt and Green in studying the
denominational differences in American Protestantism.43 I used both the ARDA Religious
Congregations and Membership study (cited above) as well as the white evangelical/white
mainline denominations list provided by Kellstedt and Green (reproduced above in Table 1.1).44
For years before 1992, I recoded answers to the question, “If Protestant, What Denomination Are
You?” into evangelical and mainline Protestant based on the above denomination lists. After
1992, the ANES question changed to ask the respondent to self-identify as evangelical or
mainline Protestant. The ANES cumulative data file (data from 1948-2010 aggregated) recodes
responses denominationally such that evangelical is an option in the religious preference
question.
Because most GSS years do not break Protestant identifiers into specific denominations, I
distinguished between evangelical and mainline using the fundamentalism index. The GSS asks
respondents to self-identify as religious fundamentalists, moderates, or liberals. I recoded the
religious preference variable with the fundamentalism index to define evangelicals as Protestant
fundamentalists. Protestant moderates and Protestant liberals were recoded into mainline
Protestants. Although this is an imperfect measure – as previously, it is possible to be an
43
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evangelical without being a fundamentalist but not possible to be a fundamentalist without being
an evangelical45 – it nonetheless captures my target demographic.
Generally speaking, these assumptions present a sizeable margin for error in the data
presented in this paper. In addition to the aforementioned difficulties in defining exactly who is
an evangelical, polling and/or survey data itself is seen as a somewhat problematic measure of
opinion.46 Survey respondents may be untruthful, and data quality may depend on factors outside
the control of the study. Noted public opinion scholar James Stimson lays out his assumptions
about public opinion data and analysis, explaining that while public opinion can be informative
and a useful tool, it must be qualified.47 For example, according to Stimson, not only is public
opinion highly influenced by the media, but also the specific wording of questions is influential
in results.48 Simply put, some degree of inaccuracy is inevitable.

Outline for the Study
This paper is organized into five chapters. The next provides the historical, social, and
political contexts of the most recent politicization of white evangelicals (during the 1970s), as
well as insight into the formation of a political (“Christian”) group identity. I present two
simultaneous factors at play in this process. On the one hand, I argue that the social and political
turbulence of the 1960s at least in part factored into a new issue calculus in American politics
that included questions deeply rooted in culture and morality. I focus on the movement of sex-
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related questions into the political arena – abortion, contraception, homosexuality, and
pornography, for example – as well as family policy (the ERA) and changes in education policy.
Combined with the general leftward drift of public opinion on these new and/or newly salient
issues, the American political equilibrium began to change. This offended white evangelicals,
who clung to traditionalist – grounded in literal biblical interpretation – views on sex, culture,
and family. I assert that evangelicals viewed their lifestyle and cultural foundations as threatened
by the cultural, moral, and social transformation of American politics and society. Partly as a
result of this conflict, white evangelicals moved towards the political arena. At the same time,
the group enjoyed newfound resources and sources of capital. Technological advancements
paved the way for televangelism and the institution of the electronic church, which became key
factors in the white evangelical political mobilization. Coupled with the rise of charismatic
leadership – Billy Graham, Jerry Falwell, and Pat Robertson – white evangelicals enjoyed a
massive upswing in financial, social, and human capital. I argue that the combination of changes
in the political atmosphere with newfound sources of capital at least partially provided the group
with the agency to become politically active.
Chapter 3 considers the partisan affiliation of this group of politicized white evangelicals.
I argue that once politicized, it was by no means a foregone conclusion that white evangelicals
would widely become Republican Party constituents. Instead, I contend that the fact of affiliation
with the GOP was a result of two simultaneous political phenomena. These are perhaps best
defined as concurrent top-down and bottom-up methods of partisan incorporation. The top-down
method suggests that GOP elites shifted issue positions and rhetoric in order to attract white
evangelicals (as a new constituency) into the existing party coalition. This contributed to party
polarization on social issues, as the GOP moved to the right to appeal to socially conservative
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voting blocs. Meanwhile, the same cultural changes that created a new issue calculus (and
prompted the leftward movement of public opinion on these issues) also changed the American
party dynamic. Heightened polarization around social issues helped to not only reorganize the
party coalitions but also provide the opportunity for the parties to further expand their existing
coalitions. This had large implications for white evangelicals. Historically (although weakly)
Democratic Party constituents, white evangelicals were to some degree alienated by Democratic
cultural and racial policymaking during the 1960s.49 I argue that this initiated a process of
partisan dealignment and realignment through the 1970s, which culminated with white
evangelicals voting in large proportion for Reagan in 1980 and 1984. Because it was mostly
group leaders and clergy who initiated realignment, we can describe this process as a bottom-up
partisan affiliation. Indeed, group leaders mobilized rank and file members to vote for a new
party (the GOP) based on Democratic cultural and racial liberalism I argue that the simultaneous
initiation of these two processes (top-down and bottom-up) explains contemporary white
evangelical consistent affiliation with the GOP.
I then consider (Chapter 4) how the group changed as a result of partisan affiliation,
presenting partisan incorporation as a key driver of opinion change. First, I argue that
conventional wisdom explanations of the rightward drift of white evangelical opinion on fiscal
policy/social welfare issues are incomplete. As a result, a more holistic understanding of white
evangelical fiscal policy and social welfare preferences takes into account the effect of affiliation
with the Republican Party. I suggest that party affiliation affects the way people see political
issues. I rely on a large public opinion literature – as well as intuition dating to the famed letter
from Martin Van Buren to Thomas Ritchie (1827) suggesting that the Republican Party could be
49
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reconstituted by creating a partisan bridge between the planters of the South and the Republicans
of the North – for the qualitative basis of my argument. Affiliation with the GOP on the basis of
party position taking on social issues and moral conservatism thus helped to change the way
white evangelicals saw fiscal policy and social welfare issues. Consistent with this theory, I offer
longitudinal analyses of ANES and GSS data that shed light on the timing of opinion changes. I
find that since the 1970s, white evangelicals have moved to the right (away from most
Democrats and towards Republicans) on select fiscal policy and social welfare questions. I
conclude that the effects of party affiliation help to explain the change in white evangelical
opinion on fiscal policy and social welfare issues.
The study closes with brief concluding remarks. I comment on the key findings of the
study and the possible contributions to the literature that this paper provides. I will then comment
on journalistic accounts that tend to treat white evangelicals reductionistically. Specifically, I
consider Thomas Frank’s controversial What’s the Matter With Kansas, and argue that the
Frank’s value judgments are unhelpful in understanding the political motivations of white
evangelicals. I conclude with a short discussion of the future of evangelicals in American
politics, and provide insight into the possibility of future party position change.
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Chapter 2: The “Fourth Great Awakening”50
and the Politicization of White Evangelicals
The organization of white evangelicals into a movement with considerable power in
American politics was not an overnight transformation. Rather, as I will show, it was a gradual
and complex process that involved group formation, political mobilization, and partisan
realignment.51 Yet before I discuss the group’s political and partisan preferences, it is first
important to understand the basics of white evangelical group identity. As we know, socially
conservative evangelicals are an important constituency of the Republican Party; however, that
was not always the case. In fact, it was only after politicization and group formation processes
that this group became active in politics, and eventually came to wield some power as a
constituency of the GOP.
Although the roots of American evangelicalism can perhaps be traced to the prerevolutionary settlement of the American frontier, few accounts of meaningful politicizations of
evangelicals exist prior to the Scopes trial.52 Despite the fact that the Tennessee court ruled
against the teaching of evolution in public schools, the group’s foray into the American
mainstream was met with limited success.53 As I suggest in Chapter 1, conservative evangelicals
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were undone by a lack of organization, fragmented leadership, and harsh treatment by the liberalminded media. Consequently, evangelicals, as a political group, fell back into temporary political
obscurity after the conclusion of the trial. This brief political mobilization during the 1920s was
important for future evangelical political activity, and served as a launching pad for future
evangelical politicizations.
Some white evangelicals resurfaced on the national political scene during the height of
the Cold War to join the fight against domestic communism. As political scientist Clyde Wilcox
explains, “McCarthy’s campaign helped establish a political market for anticommunist groups,
and [Christian] fundamentalist entrepreneurs formed a set of new political organizations to take
part in the anticommunist movement.”54 Although weak, short-lived, and never attracting a large
audience, the existence of politically mobilized, primarily white evangelical organizations
demonstrates an important midpoint between Scopes trial and contemporary white evangelicals.
The issue agenda of evangelical anticommunist groups was broader than the one pursued by the
antievolution groups of the 1920s, and included the opposition to Medicare (so called “socialized
medicine”) and sex education in addition to combating domestic communism.55 Moreover, after
the demise of McCarthy’s crusade, the movement’s infrastructure turned its attention to
supporting Barry Goldwater’s 1964 presidential bid.56 Thus, the participation of white
evangelicals in the domestic anticommunist, anti-Medicare, and anti-sex education movements
during the 1950s foreshadowed the emergence of a group of politically mobile white
evangelicals in the 1970s.
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The sociologist James Davidson Hunter describes these three politicization processes
(1920s, 1950s, 1970s) as the “three waves” of evangelical political activism in the 20th century.57
Wilcox agrees, and points out that a period of political inactivity followed each of the first two
(1920s, 1950s) episodes of political activity.58 Yet as we will see, the third “wave” shows several
divergent characteristics from the previous two. Perhaps most importantly, despite several claims
of the movement’s inevitable failure on the part of historians and sociologists, white
evangelicals, have remained influential in the GOP since the late 1970s.59 Wilcox’s observation
that evangelical political activism tends to be followed by inactivity is thus problematic – the
movement remains relevant in American politics today.
As a result, this chapter will consider the most recent political mobilization of white
evangelicals. From a socio-historical perspective, there seem to be more reasons to see the 1970s
mobilization of white evangelicals as an anomaly rather than an expected outcome. As political
scientist Duane Oldfield explains, “From the 1930s through the 1960s, evangelical resources
tended not to be mobilized for political ends. … Any such mobilization would have to deal with
some serious problems rooted in the historical legacy of evangelicalism.”60 In noting these
problems, Oldfield refers to the fact that evangelical doctrine was previously interpreted to
demand a largely apolitical lifestyle.61 Moreover, evangelicals tended to be geographically,
socially, and economically isolated.62 Consequently, the political mobilization of conservative
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evangelicals should not be thought of as a foregone conclusion. Rather, the fact that the group
did in fact mobilize and form a political identity requires explanation.
I will first contextualize the white evangelical political mobilization during the 1970s
from a cultural-moral perspective. In doing so, I argue that the leftward movement of public
opinion on social issues during the period prior (1950s-1970s) to widespread politicization in
many respects created a cultural cleavage that “pushed” the group to the brink of mobilization.
As a new and changed set of cultural issues gained salience in American politics, evangelicals
were tasked with defending their lifestyle and cultural foundations. I will then consider the
impact of newfound resources that came into the possession of white evangelicals during this
time period. These include technological innovations leading to the rise of televangelism and the
emergence of charismatic leadership. In short, white evangelicals during the 1970s-1980s gained
access to economic, human, and technological resources that at least in part provided the group
with the capacity to become politically active. Thus, my argument suggests that cultural changes
created a new issue calculus in American politics, which, along with the leftward movement of
mass opinion on those issues, served as a primary motivating factor for evangelical
politicization. Coupled with access to a new set of resources and capital, this paved the way not
only for white evangelicals’ foray into politics but also the formation of a political identity.

A Pathologically Limited Literature?
Before beginning the argument, however, it is important to note that that much of the
literature focuses on an exclusively capacities-based explanation of white evangelical
politicization. By emphasizing the resources and ignoring the cultural shocks of the 1950s-1970s,
these explanations are limited. I thus observe a pathology of the literature that portrays white
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evangelicals reductionistically. For example, in explaining white evangelical political
mobilization, scholars have cited resources and structure, status politics and the rapid expansion
of the electronic church, technological advancements, and new Christian groups with dynamic
leadership, to name a few.63 These treatments view evangelicals as simply waiting for the
capacity to become political. Given this perspective, those resources happened to arrive in
evangelical hands at the right time. While this assessment is plausible, a more complete account
would consider both the social changes that produced a new set of culturally threatening (to
evangelicals) issues and the leftward drift of mass opinion on these issues. As a result, I argue
that a broader historical perspective – one that considers both the historical context of issue
evolution and public opinion as well as the group’s newfound resources – is necessary to analyze
the observed politicization more completely. I will first consider the historical context of social
change and its influence on white evangelical political mobilization.

Social Change: New Issues and New Problems
Scholars have debated whether contemporary American society is engaged in a “culture
war” between those with “progressive” and “orthodox” moral views.64 According to this
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literature, at the heart of the conflict are fundamental religious and moral divisions between
different groups in society. While there are merits and pitfalls to this viewpoint there is little
doubt that substantial social changes have occurred in the US in the last century.65 Public opinion
analysis reflects these changes. For example, national mood data shows that mass opinion has
drifted leftward in the 20th century. Specifically, noted public opinion scholar James Stimson’s
account finds that, across several salient issues, the US experienced a drift toward liberalism
between 1956 and 1976.66 Thus not only were new issues apparent – or old issues becoming
newly salient – but also there was a general leftward drift of opinion on these issues. This finding
is central to understanding the sociopolitical and cultural contexts of white evangelical political
mobilization.
In assessing these changes, noted political scientist Ronald Inglehart’s postmaterialism
hypothesis provides a useful qualitative framework. In short, Inglehart suggests that in the postWorld War II period, a fundamental change has occurred in the value systems of Western
industrial democracies. Inglehart argues that Western societies tend to be moving away from
“material” values, such as economic growth and domestic order, and moving toward
“postmaterial” values such as quality of life and social solidarity. This, according to Inglehart,
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has significant implications for political culture, and accounts for both the development of new
salient issues and the leftward movement of public opinion on those issues.67
Political scientists have considered the degree to which Inglehart’s predictions hold true
in the American context, and in some cases conclude that Inglehart’s hypotheses have been
realized. For example, in his assessment of social issues in American politics, Jelen asserts that,
“Since the 1960s, the salience of noneconomic domestic, or the so-called social, issues has risen
dramatically.”68 To the same end, Layman and Carmines in their paper on cultural conflict and
political behavior argue that, “The percentage of postmaterialists in the American populace has
increased considerably, class-based political cleavages have weakened, and social and cultural
concerns such as abortion, homosexual rights, women’s rights, and prayer in the public schools
have moved to the forefront of American politics.”69 Furthermore, and more specifically,
scholars have argued that the rise of postmaterialist societies helps to explain religio-political
mobilization.70 This insight helps to contextualize the white evangelical response to rising
postmaterial values and leftward drift of opinion on salient social and cultural issues. I follow
Inglehart’s reasoning explaining the origins of the white evangelical politicization of the 1970s.
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White evangelicals saw new, or newly salient, sociocultural issues as a marked change
from the previous status quo – in Inglehart’s dichotomy, the materialist view. Perhaps more
importantly, the leftward movement of public opinion on these issues threatened conservative
evangelical moral traditionalism. Yet it was not just evangelicals. As Hunter points out, “From
the 1920s to the 1960s, most Americans, whether they were conservative Protestants or not,
continued to believe in the legitimacy of 19th century definitions of moral and familial
property.”71 This observation is illustrative of the extent of cultural change that came about
during the 1960s and 1970s. Indeed, it is important to understand that white evangelicals, like
many moral conservatives, saw the leftward drift of public opinion on issues deeply rooted in
morality and culture as threatening to their way of life.
Frank Lambert, in his treatment of religion and politics in the 20th century, embraces the
notion of American cultural change and resultant conflict, and furthermore suggests that it
incited evangelical political action. For example, “They [conservative evangelicals] were
appalled at the cultural assault on the nation’s Christian heritage that was mounted in the 1960s
when a radical counterculture movement attacked what conservatives deemed sacred while
embracing what that which they held to be sacrilege.”72 Lambert argues that new issues, and
progressive mass public opinion on those issues, may have led white evangelicals to political
mobilization. This resulted in a symbolic “political reawakening” of white evangelicals.73
Political scientists Bolce and De Maio summarize this viewpoint in considering a “religious
divide” in the American electorate: “What later became known as the ‘Christian Right’
movement was itself a defensive reaction against threats to traditional values brought about by
71
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the secularization of national culture in the 1960s.”74 This implies that lifestyle defense is a key
engine of change. I will corroborate this viewpoint.

Lifestyle Defense
Several scholars discuss lifestyle defense as an impetus for white evangelical political
mobilization. This literature suggests that evangelicals feel that they have no choice but to
become involved politically in order to protect their lifestyle. 75 Lifestyle defense is qualitatively
consistent with the arguments outlined above pertaining to white evangelical political action
incited by newly salient issues and the leftward drift of opinion on those issues. Although few
empirical studies test this hypothesis, many scholars find it persuasive. For example, according
to Bruce, “The NCR [New Christian Right] is a movement of cultural defense … it is concerned
with the politics of lifestyles.”76 More convincingly, journalist Michael Sean Winters, in his 2012
biography of Jerry Falwell, makes the case for lifestyle defense as a primary motivating factor
for evangelical political activity. For example:
Falwell had established himself as a national player in the evangelical world, but in the
1970s he and other evangelicals came to believe that their world was under attack. On a
host of issues, their core beliefs were being challenged or repudiated by mainstream
culture. Their cultural isolation from that mainstream culture and efforts to evangelize
had not been able to prevent what they viewed as cultural decline. On issue after issue,
from abortion to the tax-exempt status of Christian schools, the political world seemed, at
best, to be infringing on the moral universe of the fundamentalist community, or
attacking it at worst.77
74
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Sociologist Christian Smith’s ethnographic study of evangelicals shows that the group
tends to see the protection of the evangelical lifestyle as a mission from God.78 This mission has
caused several important developments in evangelical society and culture. For instance, the
lifestyle threat posed by secular education caused a substantial growth in Christian higher
education.79 As a result, Christian colleges rose dramatically in popularity during the 1960s1980s, providing a conservative Christian alternative to growing liberalism on college
campuses.80 Simultaneously, Christian printing houses helped to create infrastructure and
organization among socially conservative evangelicals, and provided a forum for expression of
lifestyle defense concerns.81 These printing houses led to a rise in Christian bookstores, and Hal
Lindsey’s 1969 The Late, Great Planet Earth – a “fundamentalist” book with a “premillennial
message about the Second Coming” – became one of the best selling books of the 1970s.82
The prominence of such a book suggests that a significant component of the white
evangelical politicization is the defense of an “evangelical way of life.” This includes the
rejection of “secular humanism,”83 defense of the role of religion in public life, and more
generally a desire for moral, cultural, and social traditionalism.84 Lifestyle/cultural defense is
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thus helpful in considering the group’s reaction to salient issues during the 1970s. However,
lifestyle defense literature has been criticized. For example, Smith contends that lifestyle defense
explanations are insufficient. Rather, Smith argues that a more complex identity theory is
necessary to understand evangelical politics. This concept includes lifestyle defense, but also
incorporates collective identity, distinctions between evangelicals and other (Protestant) religious
groups, and the concept of an evangelical social mission. Additionally, Smith asserts that
explanations of evangelical politics should consider the nuance inherent in defining
“evangelical” and the variation of belief (discussed in Chapter 1) within the group.85 Though
these complications are valid, lifestyle defense theory remains useful and relevant in considering
evangelical political action.
Also, some scholars argue that a rise in socioeconomic status contributed to the white
evangelical political mobilization. These arguments consider status gains in education and
income central in providing white evangelicals with the capacity and desire to become politically
active.86 However, a large literature problematizes status politics explanations. For example, both
Oldfield and Wilcox and Fortenly note that evangelicals tend to be at or near the bottom of the
social ladder; therefore, it is unlikely that widespread increases in socioeconomic status could
have incited evangelical politicization.87 As I will show in Chapter 4, while white evangelicals
have gained in terms of educational attainment and other measures of socioeconomic standing,
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the group remains relatively behind other demographic groups.88 Although it is important to note
the individual status gains some white evangelicals have made, particularly the emergence of an
evangelical elite, these gains may not be compelling as an explanation for white evangelical
political mobilization.89
However, the combination of newly salient issues, the leftward drift of mass public
opinion on those issues, and need to defend the evangelical lifestyle provide a plausible
theoretical framework for white evangelical politicization. Work by political scientists Leege,
Wald, Krueger, and Mueller suggests that cultural differences, resulting in differences of opinion
on salient political issues, may be a primary factor in political mobilization.90 I support this
contention. I argue that cultural cleavages during the 1950s-1970s produced newly salient issues
– among others, abortion, the ERA, and school prayer/the Christian school movement – that,
along with the overall movement left of public opinion on these issues and new resources and
sources of financial and political capital, helped to incite evangelical political activism.

Abortion
Sexual politics did not become common in American political discourse until the mid20th century. In a landmark ruling, the Supreme Court decided in 1965 that a Connecticut statue
banning the spread of information about contraceptives was unconstitutional in Griswold v.
Connecticut. The Court thus interpreted the Constitution to afford citizens a right to privacy,
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thereby invalidating the last vestiges of state laws against birth control distribution.91 Historian
Daniel Williams points out that Griswold contributed to a changing national attitude on sexual
politics that both helped to make abortion a salient issue and set the stage for Roe.92 Indeed, the
proximity of abortion to “ultimate concerns of human life” and sexual morality helps to explain
why abortion is both a culturally and morally fraught issue and politically polarizing.93 While the
1960s saw many instances of sexual liberalism/liberation, the decade also saw a conservative
backlash against what was seen as “licentiousness.”94 As a result, the movement of sex into
mainstream American culture and politics may have compelled evangelicals to take a stand on
sexual issues.95 Fundamentally morally traditionalist and largely culturally conservative, it is not
surprising that white evangelicals rejected sexual liberalism. Indeed, political scientist Amy
Fried argues that abortion was (and still is) a symbolic issue for evangelicals, which may help to
explain why evangelical discourse on abortion is highly emotional.96 This being the case, white
evangelicals situated themselves in opposition to abortion and pro-choice policy as the issue
became politically divisive.
Consequently, evangelicals reacted strongly to the Court’s 1973 decision permitting
early-term abortions in Roe v. Wade. Although the fastest religious anti-abortion response in the
wake of Roe belonged to the Roman Catholic Church, evangelicals undoubtedly rejected
abortion on moral grounds.97 Because Roe came down before white evangelicals became
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politicized, it is not surprising that there was not an immediate evangelical backlash. Yet as
white evangelicals moved into the political mainstream, their sexually conservative views on
abortion became apparent. Moreover, the white evangelical tendency to associate pro-abortion
activism with feminism and the sexual revolution exacerbated the group’s rejection of Roe.98
As Putnam and Campbell show, evangelicals are significantly more likely to disapprove
of abortions than non-evangelicals for social reasons. In 1973, nearly 60% of evangelicals
disapproved compared with only 40% of non-evangelicals. Over time, this gap has increased –
by 2008 over 70% of evangelicals disapproved of abortion for social reasons.99 As abortion
became a salient social issue in American politics, evangelicals took a side, seeing Roe, and the
institution of abortion more generally, as threatening.100
So much so, in fact, that Ronald Reagan garnered substantial support among evangelicals
by speaking out against abortion and nominating the noted antiabortionist doctor C. Everett
Koop to surgeon general.101 Reagan appointed several other prominent antiabortionists to
administration posts including evangelical Gary Bauer in the Public Liaison Office as well as all
three heads of the Department of Health and Human Services: Richard Schweiker, Margaret
Heckler, and Otis Bowen.102 Koop had become famous among evangelicals after authoring and
starring in the antiabortionist book and later film Whatever Happened to the Human Race?
(1979) The film, which is widely credited with helping to mobilize white evangelicals against
98
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abortion, argues that the Judeo-Christian “high view of human life” has been replaced by a
humanistic, “low view of human life.”103 This rhetoric was echoed by evangelical leaders, who
utilized Roe as an example of secularists exerting “godless” influence on political debates.
Fervent anti-abortion sentiment from white evangelical leaders contextualizes the
strength of the evangelical response to Roe. As Susan Harding points out in her treatment of the
language of Jerry Falwell, Falwell and other evangelical leaders, “convinced many conservative
Protestants that a strict pro-life position was both God’s word and the traditional Christian
position.”104 Consequently, the emergence of sexual politics as a contentious political issue
forced evangelicals, as “protectors” of a “traditional lifestyle,” to push their rejection of sexual
liberalism into the political arena. To do so, white evangelicals had to become politically active.
Therefore, it becomes clear that Roe and pro-abortion politics helped to spark the evangelical
political mobilization and, as we will see in Chapter 3, helped to shape evangelical affiliation
with the GOP. In the next section, I consider an additional issue and associated cultural shift that
gained salience during the 1970s: the ERA, feminism, and the rejection of traditional gender
roles.

The ERA, Feminism, and Changing Gender Roles
At the same time that white evangelicals were beginning to speak out against abortion,
they too made clear their opposition to the ERA. Famously considered by Congress (and debated
in the national media) during the 1970s, the ERA was a proposed constitutional amendment that
would guarantee equal rights to all persons regardless of sex.105 Although its language was
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simple, there was uncertainty as to what social changes the amendment would require. As a
result, after the Senate voted to approve in 1972, sending the ERA to the states for ratification,
political discourse over the proposed amendment increased dramatically. Though the ERA was
not a new issue in Washington, the fact that the 92nd Congress voted to ratify demonstrated its
newfound salience. Also, the national attention and support given to the amendment, feminism,
and the sexual revolution provides an example of one instance of the leftward drift of mass
opinion. Because the ERA raised questions fundamental to the individual conception of family
and gender roles, it became politically divisive. Partly as a result of the political debates
surrounding the ERA, according to Putnam and Campbell, “The 1970s witnessed a dramatic
change in gender norms and gender roles in America.”106 This offended traditionalist white
evangelicals.
Indeed, the movement towards gender equality contrasted with the traditional
evangelical conception of family. As Smith explains, evangelicals tend to adhere to traditional,
patriarchal gender roles. That is, the husband is the “head of the family and of his wife.”107 Not
surprisingly, white evangelical leaders framed their opposition to the proposed constitutional
amendment as part of the “defense of the traditional family.”108 Interestingly, political scientist
Kristi Anderson explains that many white evangelical women did not oppose the ERA until they
saw it as fundamentally challenging their worldview.109 This observation further implies that the
feminist movement can be counted as one of the cultural-social trends that thrust white
evangelicals towards political mobilization. In commenting on Anderson’s findings, religion in
politics scholars Wald and Leege point out that evangelicals did not see the ERA as a measure
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for gender equality, but rather, “an important pillar of cultural degradation and a revolt against
God’s law.”110 Reflecting this sentiment, many white evangelicals viewed the women’s
liberation movement as indicative of other troubling social trends such as the movement of
women into the workplace and women choosing not to procreate.111 Empirically consistent with
this claim, Figure 2.2 shows white evangelical agreement with the statement, “women should
take care of the home,” between 1974 and 1998.
Figure 2.1

Women Should Take Care of the Home, 1974-1998
60.0%
50.0%
40.0%

White Evangelicals
Total Whites

30.0%

Total Population

20.0%
10.0%
1974 1977 1982 1985 1988 1990 1993 1996
Source: The General Social Survey, cumulative data file, 1974-1998

As we would expect, white evangelicals are more likely than total whites or the population at
large to believe that it is the woman’s job to take care of the home. Given this context, it is not
surprising that many white evangelicals mobilized in response to the ERA – the ERA was an
infringement of the traditional conception of family values and, to some, social order.
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As a result, like abortion, anti-ERA sentiment politically united evangelicals. Indeed,
white evangelicals were important actors in the anti-ERA movement, especially after the
amendment got within three states of the two-thirds needed for ratification. As Jane Mansbridge
suggests in her influential Why We Lost the ERA, white evangelicals not only rallied against the
ERA, but also some adherents became important strategic actors in its failure.112 Further, the
Concerned Women for America (CWA), an important anti-ERA group, was principally
organized in evangelical churches and largely populated by white evangelical women.113
Therefore, the ERA became a political venue for evangelical activists to “fight back” against the
“infringement” on traditional gender roles that, to many, the ERA represented. Empirically,
evangelicals tended to favor the ERA at lower levels than the general public.114 Hunter finds that
even on college campuses – generally an area of high support for the proposed amendment –
25% of evangelical students supported the ERA compared with 66% of public university
students.115 More generally, Table 2.1 displays white evangelical attitudes on the ERA in 1977
and 1982.
Table 2.1

Strongly Oppose the ERA, 1977 and 1982
White Evangelicals
1977
16.2%
1982
16.9%

Total Whites
10.1%
9.7%

Total Population
9.9%
8.5%

Source: The General Social Survey, 1977 and 1982

As we can see, white evangelicals were more likely to strongly oppose the ERA than both all
whites and the total population. This finding is consistent with the observation that through the
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1970s and 1980s, white evangelicals were more conservative on women’s role in society than all
whites and the total population.
The political mobilization stemming from white evangelical opposition to the ERA was
vast. In Harding’s words, the ERA “led conservative Protestants to form dozens of lobbies and
organizations to represent their interests and publicly promote their points of view.”116 Moreover,
headlined by the CWA, many anti-ratification activists and groups were based in evangelical
churches.117 As a result, the fight to defeat the ERA became an important element of the group’s
political mobilization.
Furthermore, the anti-ERA campaign was especially significant because it demonstrated
that a grassroots campaign could have a substantial national impact. Despite being directed at a
national level and concerning a federal issue, the anti-ERA campaign was “in operation a
coalition of local efforts.”118 Thus the largely evangelical-led campaign against the ERA
demonstrates two important factors in considering the mobilization of evangelicals. First, antiERA mobilization revealed that evangelicals were willing to fight for their conception of
traditional family values. Perhaps more importantly, the fight against the ERA showed both the
world and evangelical actors themselves that a grassroots campaign confined to a relatively small
geographic region – in this case, the South – could have a meaningful impact on national politics
and federal policymaking. In short, the success of the anti-ERA campaign (the proposed
amendment expired in 1982) illustrated both the sizeable resources and potential power of a
politically mobilized white evangelical community.
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Education: School Prayer and Christian Schools
While both abortion and the ERA hit home for socially conservative evangelicals, there is
perhaps no issue more important to the group’s foray into politics than education. Between the
fight for school prayer and the perceived “assault on the Christian school,” white evangelicals
vehemently defended prayer in public school, advocated for vouchers to sustain evangelical
schools, and opposed the proposed IRS requirement that private schools meet minority
enrollment quotas to be considered tax-exempt. As a result, education became significant in the
political mobilization of white evangelicals. Unlike abortion and the ERA, religion in public
education has been a political issue throughout the 20th century. However, new developments in
federal education policy during the 1960s-1970s in many ways made education newly salient and
culturally polarizing. The first of these developments was a series of Supreme Court rulings
during the 1960s.
The separationist rulings in Engle v. Vitale (1962) and Abington v. Schempp (1963) set
the stage for a political battle between conservative evangelicals and educational liberals. As
Jelen and Wilcox point out in their assessment of public opinion on church and state,
conservative evangelicals tend to be “Christian preferentialists,” meaning that they take an
accomodationist stance on church and state issues and want a public role for Christian symbols
and practices.119 As a result, the Court’s declarations that Christian symbols, practices, and
prayers have no place in public schools in Engle and Abington threatened white evangelicals.
Specifically, Engle ruled that New York could not require teachers to read a non-denominational
prayer before the school day under the First Amendment while Abington prohibited school-
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sponsored Bible readings in public schools. 120 The evangelical backlash provoked by these
decisions helped to make education a key component to the white evangelical political
mobilization.
Because many white evangelicals during the 1960s began to see (and still do) public
schools as unfit to educate their children due to the perception that it promotes anti-Christian
values, they turned to homeschooling, and more commonly, “independent Christian schools.”
These schools, generally affiliated with an evangelical church, aimed to reintroduce discipline,
moral education, and God to children’s educations.121 As religion in politics scholar James Guth
points out, “Christian schools were an institutional embodiment of the fundamentalists’ social
and moral concerns.”122 After the aforementioned Court rulings made it public policy to separate
Church and state, evangelical schools cropped up with striking regularity. By 1980, there were
16,000 evangelical elementary schools in the US. However, recurring battles with state
authorities over textbooks, facilities, and teacher qualifications presented a new set of political
problems for white evangelicals.123 These problems led many to become active participants in
the politics of education. This political engagement helped to push evangelicals to mobilize.
Furthermore, white evangelicals strongly opposed a 1978 IRS proposal that would have
mandated that private schools meet a quota of minority students to maintain tax-exempt status.124
The proposed Civil Rights Act enforcement measure caused a substantial negative reaction
among the Christian school community. Christian schools were predominantly white, and
parents and school administrators alike protested. As Williams explains, it was not that Christian
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schools discriminated per se, but rather that, “the political and social conservatism that pervaded
many Christian schools repelled the majority of African Americans.”125 Instead of create
scholarships or attempt to attract minority students, Christian school advocates engaged political
channels. There was a principally white evangelical lobby organized against the law, and over
400,000 letters were sent to members of Congress and over 120,000 sent to the IRS.126 This
engagement demonstrates that many white evangelicals saw the measure as a governmentsponsored attack on Christian schools.127 Not only did evangelical leaders speak out against the
proposal, but also the fight forced many white evangelical advocates of Christian schools into
politics.
Combined with other salient issues rooted in culture and morality, education encouraged
white evangelicals to mobilize.128 While each issue noted above (abortion, the ERA, and
education) independently pushed white evangelicals to mobilize, we should also recognize that
the issues most important to white evangelicals tended to overlap. That is, most supporters of
pro-life abortion policy also opposed the ERA, and moreover advocated for prayer in public
schools.129 As a result, not only were white evangelicals on the individual level pushed toward
political mobilization, but also found many religious peers who shared their concerns.
It is important to keep in mind that it was not only the aforementioned issues, but also the
leftward drift opinion on these newly salient issues that drove the politicization of white
evangelicals. As noted above, we observe a substantial leftward drift of public opinion on new
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social issues during the 1950s-1970s. During this time, the issues most important to evangelicals
were suddenly debated nationally, and both elite and mass opinion on these issues moved away
from the evangelical preferred traditionalism. However, the impetus for political mobilization on
the part of white evangelicals was also defined by access to resources that provided the capacity
for political mobilization. Specifically, I will discuss technological innovations – the advent of
mass direct mailings and the ability to broadcast one image instantaneously to millions of
televisions – that led to televangelism, dynamic group leadership, and the rise of the “electronic
church” as an institution.130

The Resources: Televangelism, Charismatic Leaders,
and the Gospel of Politicization
As I have shown, the motive for white evangelical political activism may be plausibly
seen as a response to cultural conflict that brought salience to new social issues. In addition to
newly salient issues, evangelicals simultaneously enjoyed newfound resources and sources of
capital – economic, technological, and human – that gave the group the agency to mobilize. I
will first consider the role of Billy Graham as a strategic actor in the politicization process.

The Beginning: Billy Graham
There is perhaps no single factor more fundamental to the mobilization of white
evangelicals than the emergence of politically active leaders who both engaged and recruited
members and imposed organization onto a previously fragmented movement. One of the first
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such leaders of the modern era was Billy Graham.131 Born in 1918 as a southern conservative
Presbyterian, Graham was born-again during the 1930s and attended Bob Jones College, the
Florida Bible Institute, and finally graduated from Wheaton College (Illinois).132 In 1949,
Graham received his big break. William Randolph Hearst, a prominent conservative newspaper
tycoon, got wind of Graham’s fervent anticommunist gospel and, “recognized the potential of the
young evangelist’s message to foster socially conservative values.” As a result, Hearst has his
editors “puff” Graham, and almost overnight Graham’s celebrity was born. 133 By the late 1950s,
Graham was a nationally known radio personality.134
Throughout the 1950s, Graham embarked on “crusades” in which he traveled nationwide
to spread the evangelical gospel, and at the same time, advocate anticommunism and social
conservatism. As a result of these crusades, the creation of an affiliated magazine (called
Decision Magazine), and Graham’s writing several books, the preacher’s fame grew.135 Although
Graham remained nonpartisan throughout his preaching career – according to his autobiography,
his two greatest political friends were Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon – Graham was a
central actor in “bringing politics to the pulpit.”136 Beginning with his charged Cold War rhetoric
and later as an advocate of more general social conservatism, Graham was one of the first
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evangelical leaders to use mass media to spread the evangelical gospel. Furthermore, Graham
encouraged and led the formation of networks between religious leaders. These networks gained
in influence intradenominationally, and later became important as existing organizational
structures when white evangelicals began to mobilize.137 Therefore, though he was not the first
religious conservative to gain fame in America, and despite his outward rejection of partisanship,
Graham was influential in the future formation of a white evangelical political identity.
With this in mind, it is important to note that Graham is still alive today and has publicly
renounced some of the policy preferences of the Christian Right. Although a self-identified
social conservative and moral traditionalist, Graham was a civil rights moderate and, after
Watergate, denounced politics completely. Coupled with his insistence on preaching about
personal salvation and leaving partisan politics out, Graham’s later disagreements with Christian
Right leaders are unsurprising.138 In contrast to the overtly political nature of contemporary white
evangelical leaders, Graham never saw himself as a political figure. Although he at times
acknowledged the political implications of his sermons, he insisted that he was solely “an
evangelist for Christ.”139 This key philosophical difference distinguishes Graham from later
noted televangelists such as Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson.
Yet, the public disagreements between Graham and other white evangelical leaders do
not discount Graham’s influence in paving the way for the group’s mobilization. A celebrity,
Graham became, in the words of evangelical historian Mark Noll, “the most attractive public
face that evangelical Protestantism has offered to the wider world since the Second World
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War.”140 Not only did Graham’s sermons attract thousands to massive auditoriums, but also they
were broadcast on radio and, later in his career, television.141 As Harding points out, Graham was
a principal pioneer of modern televangelism.142 Never before had sermons been recorded and
played back on the radio or seen on television, and this innovation, when later utilized by
preachers who were not outwardly partisan agnostic, became essential to white evangelical
politicization.

Technology and the Rise of Televangelism
The technological advancements leading to rise of the electronic church143 were
significant in providing evangelical leaders the ability to mobilize their congregants for political
ends. Before there were Christian radio and television stations broadcasting evangelical sermons,
however, mass-mailings became a primary mode of communication between group leaders and
constituents. This technology allowed evangelical group leaders to cross reference voter
preferences on certain issues. Thus it became easy to get a list of people who were, for example,
anti-ERA and anti-school busing.144 Churches and political groups could then send out a flier to
those people using a mass-mailing company to solicit donations and, more importantly, create
the appearance of an active political coalition.145 Further, the advent of direct mass mailing
became a useful tool for consciousness-raising in that it allowed groups to direct their
constituents’ attention towards a particular issue. Accordingly, mass-mailings created a market
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for information dissemination between white evangelical leaders and group members. As
television became a primary mode of white evangelical communication, this market grew.
The onset of televangelism was at least partly spurred by the 1960 Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) ruling that, “no public interest was served by it
discriminating between commercial and sustaining time.”146 This meant that broadcasters were
no longer coerced into giving away airtime for religious programming. Those who were most
willing to pay for airtime – due to the theological emphasis on evangelism, this meant many
evangelicals – benefitted tremendously from the seemingly minor rule change.147 Competition
for prime slots ensued, and, coupled with the advent of the videotape – one sermon could be
recorded and broadcast all across the country in the same week – widespread televangelism was
born.148 According to Bruce, direct mass-mailing technology and the arrival of televangelism
redefined the relationship between church leaders and congregants, making it more personal.149
This may have allowed clergy to refocus white evangelical social and financial capital on new
causes, many of them located in the political arena.
Thus the impact of televangelism should not be understated. As noted religion in politics
scholar Robert Wuthnow asserts, white evangelicals may never have formed a political group
identity or widely became politicized if not for televangelism.150 Further, the electronic church
generated a surplus of resources for white evangelical churches and organizations. These
provided new sources of capital – both financial and human – that afforded movement leaders
the opportunity to move and direct assets in new ways, importantly towards political
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mobilization.151 This is echoed in the success of the salient televangelists Jerry Falwell and Pat
Robertson.

The “Falwell Operation”
Jerry Falwell was born in Lynchburg, Virginia in 1933 to a Southern Baptist family.
After graduating from Baptist Bible College in Springfield, Missouri in 1956, Falwell became an
ordained Southern Baptist minister.152 Like Graham, Falwell’s popularity and financial success
helped not only to put his organization, the Moral Majority, on the map but also contributed to
the political mobilization of evangelicals.153 The “Falwell Operation,” as Bruce calls it, came to
include Thomas Road Baptist Church and its 16,000+ members, Liberty University ($30 million
of real estate and 6,500 students), a network of churches, and even a television station.154 A
relentless traveler and fundraiser, Falwell conducted “I love America” rallies across the country
during the late 1970s. By the end of the decade, Falwell had set up 47 state chapters of what
became the Moral Majority in 1979.155
At the same time as he was travelling nationwide, Falwell’s television program, The Old
Time Gospel Hour gained in popularity. During its peak, the show garnered as many as 20
million daily viewers and was broadcast on more than 300 stations.156 As Falwell’s celebrity
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rose, visitors poured into the Thomas Road Baptist Church. Not only did these visitors make
contributions, but also they became church members and therefore were expected to tithe 10% of
their income. The resultant financial stability allowed Falwell to buy more airtime across the
country, which reinforced the trend and produced more donations and visitors to his ministry.157
This fame was not lost on Falwell, and he used it to direct resources towards political
ends. According to Harding, Falwell did not just build a “profitable empire of evangelical
institutions.” More importantly, he led the white evangelical community, “toward a more open
engagement with American society, culture, and politics, and he helped make that worldly
engagement part of the definition of a true Bible-believing Christian.”158 Indeed, Falwell urged
white evangelicals towards political involvement and effectively blurred the line between
morality and politics. For example, Falwell frequently asserted that the only difference between
morality and politics was that the government chooses to call moral questions political
questions.159 In short, Falwell “grasped the symbiosis between conservatism in religion and
politics.”160 This is evident in Falwell’s leadership decisions as head of the Moral Majority. The
organization frequently mobilized for political ends, calling on its members to flood their
representatives with mail and phone calls.161 In addition, Falwell pushed ministers to make
politics a primary topic in sermons, register voters, and even endorse specific candidates.162
Thus, Falwell became more than a charismatic leader with a popular television show – he was a
major contributor in the political transformation of white evangelicals. Before the 1970s, the
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group tended to be relatively partisan agnostic, and only politicized to the extent that politics
could help achieve religious ends. As we know, this changed by the 1980s. The success of
Falwell’s fellow televangelist and evangelical leader Pat Robertson echoes this transformation.

Robertson: Preacher Meets Politician
The son of a longtime Democratic Congressman from Virginia who served in the House
(1933-1946) and Senate (1946-1966), Marion “Pat” Robertson graduated from Washington and
Lee, served in the military (1948-1952), and graduated from Yale Law School in 1955.
Seemingly unfulfilled, Robertson was born-again in 1956. According to Williams, he “poured
his liquor down the drain, gave away most of is possessions, and moved to New York” to study
divinity at the New York Theological Seminary, an evangelical institution.163 After becoming
ordained as a Southern Baptist minister, Robertson launched the nation’s first Christian
television network, called the Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN), in 1961.
From the CBN, Robertson helped to create the national evangelical organizations the
Christian Voice and the Christian Coalition.164 Between the CBN, his own The 700 Club, and the
periodical Pat Robertson’s Perspective, a monthly with 247,000 subscribers, Robertson spread
his religious and political views.165 Politically, Robertson combined moral, social, fiscal, and
foreign policy conservatism, and frequently interpreted political events as forerunners to the
Second Coming.166 As Robertson’s fame grew, white evangelicals became increasingly political.
This led Robertson to pursue political aspirations, running for the 1988 Republican presidential
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nomination. Although a comprehensive study of Robertson’s political career is outside the scope
of this paper, it is important to note that the existing infrastructure of the CBN, the Christian
Voice, and the Christian Coalition became important in Robertson’s bid.167 Although he failed to
secure the nomination – he came in third behind Bush and Bob Dole – the fact that Robertson
was able to bid at all relying upon evangelical institutions and infrastructure illustrates the extent
of the group’s mobilization by 1988. More generally, the gospel of politicization spread by both
Falwell and Robertson helps to explain the role of televangelism in the white evangelical
politicization.
Once political, however, white evangelicals needed a political party with which to
affiliate. In the next chapter I will consider the group’s partisan affiliation calculus. I argue that
there is little historical evidence to support the expectation that white evangelicals would become
Republican Party constituents. Rather, this affiliation is better thought of as the result of a
complicated partisan dealignment and realignment that requires context and explanation.
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Chapter 3: “God and the GOP”168?
How White Evangelicals Became Republicans
I argue in Chapter 2 that between changing cultural-political norms, “trigger” issues, the
need to defend the evangelical lifestyle, and the institutions and resources to mobilize, white
evangelicals became active in the political arena. The result of this politicization – a national
movement – demonstrates the multidimensionality of white evangelicals as political actors.
While earlier evangelical politicizations are perhaps best seen as chiefly single-issue campaigns,
the movement beginning during the 1970s offered a broad social, moral, and political
program.169 Organizations comprised of primarily white evangelicals such as the Moral Majority
and Christian Voice had opinions on everything from traditional “Christian issues” such as
school prayer and abortion to far less Christian issues including, but not limited to, foreign policy
and economics. In short, according to Christian Right scholar Robert Liebman, white
evangelicals in the 1970s “embarked on a war of ideologies.”170 The traditional view of the
group as one-dimensional is thus problematic. Rather, it becomes clear that evangelicals should
be viewed as multifaceted actors with complex preferences.
This multidimensionality made the partisan decision for white evangelicals complicated.
Although today pundits and scholars point to white evangelicals as a fundamental component of
the GOP electoral coalition and an important “pressure group” in Republican Party politics, it
should not be thought of as inevitable that white evangelicals would become GOP
168
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constituents.171 It is useful to begin an explanation of why they did with a somewhat comparable
religious group that, from a party affiliation perspective, ended up quite differently: Catholics.
Indeed, a historical analysis of Catholic partisan preferences helps to contextualize the white
evangelical-GOP affiliation by presenting a plausible alternative scenario.
The difference in historical trajectory of American Catholics and white evangelicals is
particularly interesting based on both groups’ predisposition for social conservatism.172 Like
white evangelicals, Catholics are traditionally socially conservative. For example, both the
McCarthyites and the John Birch Society drew substantial backing from Catholics, and, as noted
in Chapter 2, many Catholics rejected Roe.173 Indeed, Catholics became a major force in resisting
sexual liberalism and the liberalization of abortion laws.174 Nonetheless, during the 1960s a large
and growing number of American Catholics began to associate with more progressive political
causes. So much so that during the late 20th century, “Catholicism shed its once predictable
moral traditionalism to embrace a number of major social reforms.”175 Thus, contemporary
Catholics are split between those who adhere to traditional Catholic social conservatism (identify
as Republicans) and those who advocate more progressive politics (identify as Democrats.).176
Catholics’ historically strong ties to the Democratic Party – stemming from large numbers of
Catholic immigrants during the 20th century and later overwhelming pro-New Deal politics –
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have become markedly less robust since 1960. Figure 3.1 shows Catholic partisan identification
longitudinally.
Figure 3.1

Catholics and Party Identification, 1960-2008
80.0%
60.0%
Democrat

40.0%

Republican
Independent

20.0%
0.0%

Note: “Democratic” and “Republican” includes those who indicated they were leaning to the party in question.
Source: American National Election Studies (1960-2008)

Since 1960, when over 70% of Catholics identified as Democrats, there has been a substantial
movement of Catholics out of the Democratic Party and into the GOP. By 2008, Catholics split
evenly between the two parties.
Scholars have explained this realignment in a variety of ways. Perhaps most compelling,
the noted political scientist A. James Reichley points out that party position change may account
for the realignment, stating, “Since at least 1964 conservative strategists have regarded workingclass Catholics as one of the two major blocs of voters (white southerners being the other) who
would have been attracted to the conservative side in order to achieve a realignment of American
politics.”177 However, there is a fundamental difference between the Catholic and white
evangelical partisan realignments. While white evangelicals changed from Democratic to
177
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overwhelmingly Republican between 1960 and 2008 (see Figure 3.2), Catholics, in 2008, split
evenly between the parties. Realignment has clearly occurred in both cases, but while
contemporary white evangelicals dependably vote for Republicans, today’s Catholics have no
consistent partisan preference.
Because Catholics and evangelicals, in a sense, started from the same place – social
conservatism – but developed as political groups in distinctly different ways, Catholics’ split
partisan allegiance may present a plausible alternative scenario to the evangelical partisan
trajectory. However, there are important theological differences between the two groups. Perhaps
most notably, Catholicism does not connote the same intensity of views – for example, biblical
literalism – that evangelicalism does. Indeed, there are few “moderate” evangelicals based on the
theological definition of who is an evangelical. As a result, the comparison is limited. Yet,
Catholic party identification data demonstrates that, given a changed set of historical, social, and
political circumstances, we might observe a different affiliation pattern – or no consistent
partisan affiliation at all – with regards to white evangelicals.
Given the possibility of a different outcome, I explore the historical, social, and political
dynamics of white evangelical partisan affiliation. In doing so, I provide an explanation for why
we observe white evangelicals today widely affiliated with the GOP. First, I explain why the
group was perhaps best thought of as “up for grabs” in terms of party affiliation as late as the
middle part of the 20th century. I then examine the group’s incorporation into the Republican
Party, critically evaluating two scholarly explanations of how and why white evangelicals
became a constituency of the GOP. The first, from David Karol, focuses almost exclusively on
party elites as political entrepreneurs. The other, from Geoffrey Layman, places the movement of
conservative evangelicals into the GOP as part of a larger partisan realignment of southern
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whites, focusing more on group actors. I will conclude that while Karol’s framework is in many
respects instructive, it is limited because it considers evangelicals one-dimensional Christian
issue political actors. That is, it does not account for issues or political conflict outside the direct
political transaction between Republican elites and white evangelical actors, thereby ignoring the
fact that evangelicals have preferences on both Christian issues and other issues.178
Conversely, Layman’s model, by embracing the cultural conflicts that resulted from
Democratic cultural and racial liberalism (and Civil Rights policymaking) during the 1960s1970s, takes into account at least some simultaneous political turmoil. This allows for a more
complete understanding of evangelical political behavior and partisan preference. However, by
emphasizing the idea of a culture war, Layman’s explanation is also limited. The culture wars
thesis is problematic in that it minimizes the influence of political entrepreneurs and
oversimplifies complex religious, social, and moral cleavages.179 I will therefore conclude that
because both explanations are limited in scope and applicability, they should be thought of as
simultaneous political processes.

A “Sleeping Giant”? White Evangelicals and Party Affiliation
Despite salient evangelical Republicans such as Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson, it is
problematic to assume that white evangelicals would inevitably become (or always were)
Republican Party constituents. In fact, it would be better to consider white evangelicals, who
were weakly affiliated with the Democratic Party through the 1960s, relatively unattached voters
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until the late 1970s. Political scientist Albert Menendez goes as far as to characterize
evangelicals as historically the “sleeping giant of American electoral politics” in his 1977
book.180 Menendez draws on both the group’s size – white evangelicals make up approximately
25% of the electorate – and historically nonpartisan inclinations to support his claim.181 Years of
relative political isolation, perhaps due to geographic, social, and economic isolation, help to
contextualize Menendez’s claim.182 Additionally, evangelicals historically resisted politicization,
preferring instead to attempt to “save souls” rather than reform society.183 Reichley sums up this
perspective in observing that white evangelicals were historically “quiescent” Democrats, mostly
as a result of their concentration in the South where the Democratic Party had “monopolized”
political power.184 Based on white evangelicals’ historical status as relatively unattached voters
as well as group’s theological distrust of politics, incorporation into the Republican Party does
not seem intuitive or expected.
This is further illustrated in Table 3.1, showing the groups that were most closely
associated with the Republican and Democratic Parties in 1972 and 1984. During the early
1970s, evangelicals remained, to use Reichley’s terminology, quiescent, at least in the eyes of
party constituents – the group was not closely associated with either party in 1972. Yet by 1984,
evangelicals were strongly associated with the GOP, demonstrating the group’s partisan
incorporation.185 Therefore there must have been some group-party affiliation process between
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1972 and 1984 that to a large degree drove evangelicals into the Republican Party. In this light,
Menendez’s early portrayal of evangelicals as a “sleeping giant” seems fitting.
Table 3.1

Groups Most Closely Associated with the Parties
Democrats

Republicans

1972
Middle Class
Poor People
Blacks
Catholics
Labor Unions
Liberals

1984
Black Militants
Liberals
Women's Liberation
Civil Rights Leaders
Gays and Lesbians*
Labor Unions

Conservatives
The Military
Middle Class
Big Business

Evangelicals
Big Business
Conservatives
The Military
Antiabortionists

*Not included on the 1972 survey. Adapted from Arthur H. Miller, Christopher Wlezien, and Anne Hildreth, "A
Reference Group Theory of Partisan Coalitions," The Journal of Politics 53, no. 4 (1991). As cited in Oldfield, The
Right and the Righteous: The Christian Right Confronts the Republican Party: 112.

Party identification data supports this conclusion. See Figure 3.2 for a longitudinal
analysis of white evangelical partisan identification. As we can see, since 1960 there has been a
marked shift in party identification among white evangelicals. Over 60% of white evangelicals
indicated they were either strongly or leaning Democratic in 1960; yet, by 2008 fewer than 30%
of white evangelicals identified as Democrats. These data illustrate the extent of the partisan
realignment undergone by white evangelicals since 1960.
Prior to gaining political significance in the 1970s, there was little to foreshadow
evangelicals’ future alignment with the GOP. This brings us back to William Jennings Bryan.
Arguably the first self-identified Christian fundamentalist politician, contemporary political
analysts might view Bryan’s position taking as contradictory.
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Figure 3.2

White Evangelicals and Party Identification,
1960-2008
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Note: “Democratic” and “Republican” includes those who indicated they were leaning to the party in question.
Source: American National Election Studies (1960-2008)

As we noted in the introduction, he was socially conservative, an economic populist, and an
evangelical Protestant. As an advocate of prohibition and women’s suffrage, and an outspoken
critic of teaching Darwinism in schools, Bryan’s staunch religious beliefs shaped his political
agenda. Thus Bryan and his numerous supporters complicate the notion that early Christian
fundamentalism in the US foreshadowed the contemporary evangelical association with the
Republican Party. In fact, the opposite seems more accurate: to the extent that they were
politicized, evangelicals’ political sympathies remained loosely with the Democratic Party well
after Bryan’s death in 1925.186 Indeed, while white evangelicals have always been socially
conservative, they have not always aligned themselves with the market-liberalism and fiscal
conservatism of the GOP.187
That there is no obvious or inherent link between socially conservative evangelicals and
market-liberalism, states’ rights, and pro-business policy, for example, should not come as a
186
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surprise. At their core, evangelicals hope to restore Judeo-Christian values to a country that they
see as “steeped in moral decline.”188 This has seemingly little, if anything, to do with a political
party ideologically concerned with classical liberalism, individualism, and small government.189
In light of this, the contemporary affiliation between the group and Party becomes significantly
less intuitive.
Indeed, there is no unambiguous reason that evangelicals should have chosen to affiliate
with the GOP. Rather, the evangelical partisan realignment presents a political phenomenon that
requires explanation. Scholars have attempted to explain this a variety of ways. I will focus on
two specifically, first assessing David Karol’s top-down “Coalition Group Incorporation” model.

GOP Elites and the Top-Down Theory of Incorporation
Karol’s Party Position Change in American Politics explains party position change
principally three ways: what Karol calls “Coalition Maintenance,” “Coalition Group
Incorporation,” and “Coalition Expansion.” Because Karol’s Coalition Maintenance and
Coalition Expansion explanations concern existing party constituencies and not the incorporation
of new groups, they exist outside the scope of this paper.190 However, Karol offers a useful
hypothesis in his Coalition Group Incorporation model. In short, party leaders shift positions in
order to attract a particular group or constituency, thereby redefining the existing party coalitions
with new policies.191 These party elites thus become political entrepreneurs who alter the party’s
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positioning with respect to strategic issues, initiating a political transaction with a previously
unsatisfied or unincorporated group.
Though Karol does not address the evangelical incorporation into the GOP specifically,
he does discuss the politics of abortion as an example of his theory. Karol argues that that Nixon,
Reagan, and other GOP elites sought to expand the Republican coalition by targeting specific
elements of the Democratic coalition. This process highlights abortion, and more generally
sexual conservatism, as an ideal vehicle to expand the Party’s reach. Because a large block of
socially conservative voters – traditionally affiliated with the Democratic Party – expressed
strong anti-abortion views, and there was a relative lack of sizable groups on either side of the
debate in the GOP during the 1960s-1980s, Reagan changed the official Party position on
abortion from moderate to pro-life.192 According to Karol, this helped to incorporate sexual
conservatives into the Republican coalition.
Karol’s argument is also applicable to the partisan incorporation of white evangelicals.
Republican leaders during the 1960s and 1970s searched for pockets of Democrats or
unaffiliated voters to incorporate into the Party. According to Nixon’s chief of staff H. R.
Haldeman, Nixon envisioned a, “[Republican’s] new coalition based on the Silent Majority, blue
collar Catholic, Poles, Italians, and Irish.”193 Although Haldeman did not specifically mention
evangelicals, who were only beginning to organize politically at this time, it is plausible that that
GOP leaders looked to social conservatives (specifically white evangelicals and Catholics) when
it came to expanding the Republican coalition.
In applying Karol’s framework to the evangelical-GOP affiliation, it is important to note
that both the Republican and Democratic Parties were in flux during the mid-20th century. The
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post-New Deal period brought changes in partisan politics, and both parties looked to expand
their coalitions. According to Karol, one strategy the GOP adopted was to “reach down” and
appeal to specific constituencies that could be incorporated without comprising the GOP position
as the party of business and market-liberalism. Therefore, Karol explains the white evangelicalGOP affiliation by arguing that Republican elites courted social conservatives, a large bloc of
whom were white evangelicals. White evangelical voting patterns (Figure 3.2) support this
conclusion. If GOP leaders during the 1970s and 1980s appealed specifically to (relatively
unattached) evangelical voters, we would expect evangelicals to realign with the Republican
Party. Indeed, between 1976 and 1984, evangelicals began voting for Republicans at a
significantly higher rate.
Furthermore, the formation of the “New Right” in the late 1960s was important to the
movement of white evangelicals into the Republican Party. According to Williams, “New Right
activists combined the laissez–faire economic conservatism of Goldwater with the antielitiest,
blue-collar cultural conservatism of George Wallace, Nixon, and the ‘silent majority.”194 Thus,
the primarily secular and Catholic New Right outwardly invited evangelicals into the GOP
coalition. The New Right “offered aid to conservative evangelicals’ moral campaigns” not only
by opposing both abortion and gay rights, but also by supporting “pro-family” legislation and,
importantly, evangelicals’ ongoing educational battles. Perhaps most importantly, New Right
activists took vital steps in turning white evangelical “apolitical social conservatives” into
Republican Party advocates.195 The political partnership that emerged between white
evangelicals and New Right activists was especially significant for several reasons. For one,
New Right activists encouraged white evangelicals to take positions on a variety of issues in
194
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addition to the Christian issues about which the group was historically most passionate.
Furthermore, not only did this begin a political synergy between secular/Catholic conservatives
and white evangelicals, but also allowed New Right activists to introduce political fundraising
techniques to the white evangelical community. Republican politicians continued the trends
commenced by New Right activists.
Political rhetoric from GOP leaders began to cater to the evangelical voter during the
1960s-1980s. Prior to Nixon’s election in 1968, there were few outward appeals to evangelicals
by Republican elites. However Nixon publicly aligned himself with conservative Catholics and
evangelicals by writing a plan grounded in social conservatism published in Reader’s Digest in
1967.196 Further, Nixon’s friendship and publicized White House meetings with Billy Graham
made him a visible ally of evangelicals.197 Reagan’s victories in 1980 and 1984 – with
substantial support from white evangelicals – legitimized Nixon’s belief in the possibility of a
partisan realignment to the Republican’s benefit.198 Reagan thus took Nixon’s subtle appeals to
evangelicals one step further.
For example, white evangelical leaders became common visitors to the White House
during Reagan’s time in office.199 Reagan both appointed notable evangelicals to government
posts – Moral Majority leader Bob Billings in the Department of Education and antiabortion
activist C. Everett Koop became Surgeon General – and met with white evangelical leader Gary
Bauer to discuss policy initiatives.200 Although Reagan was the only divorced man to ever
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occupy the White House and rarely attended church, he ran as a pro-family candidate and openly
courted the support of white evangelicals.201 This courtship is evident in Reagan’s direct address
to evangelicals in his 1983 “Evil Empire” speech. Reagan spoke to the national assembly of
evangelicals in Orlando, Florida, calling communism the “evil of the modern world” and
advocating for traditional morals, pro-life policy, parental notification for teens seeking an
abortion, and quoting the Bible several times.202 Although the speech spanned several issues, it
essentially, “combined culture war themes with the Cold War in an effort to enlist evangelical
support for his [Reagan’s] nuclear arms program.”203 Reagan, who as Governor of California
signed what at the time was the most liberal abortion law in the country, abandoned his previous
stance as a social moderate to appeal directly to his audience.204 Moreover, Reagan’s rhetoric
played into evangelicals’ strong anticommunist tendencies and connected Reagan’s pro-business,
anti-communist agenda to white evangelical preferred moral traditionalism.205 Because Reagan
shifted positions on a divisive social issue, ostensibly to attract evangelicals, there is little doubt
that Karol’s top-down model of incorporation holds at least some merit.
The model also suggests that after an initial shift in the party platform based on elite
position change on strategic issues, the original political entrepreneurs are replaced by leaders
with stronger opinions. This replacement serves to polarize the parties over a specific issue –
abortion, for example – and encourages activists on each side to join the appropriate party.
According to Karol, the process is cumulative and self-reinforcing: “Once inside the party they
[political elites] reinforce its new position, producing further polarization and forestalling
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backsliding. Eventually the activist base and finally the party identifiers in the electorate reflect
the parties’ new positioning.”206 Applying this process to the incorporation of evangelicals into
the GOP, Reagan magnified Nixon’s appeals to white evangelicals by reinforcing the
traditionalist GOP position on social, cultural, and sexual issues. As I argued in Chapter 2,
cultural change, newly salient issues, and new resources contextualize the political mobilization
of white evangelicals. As a result, partisan differences on issues such as school prayer, abortion,
the ERA, and foreign policy reinforced the party polarization trend and encouraged white
evangelicals to pick a side.207 Although there are several possible explanations for heightened
polarization beginning during the 1960s, it is important not to discount the effect of white
evangelicals in the GOP via party elite replacement. Also, because political discourse focused on
sex and family issues more than ever before, partisan polarization began to reflect religious
polarization.208 Yet despite several compelling points, Karol’s argument may not be a complete
explanation of the group incorporation processes.

Problematizing the Top-Down Model
One limitation of Karol’s argument stands out: it does not account for political conflicts
that unfolded at the same time as GOP elites appealed to white evangelicals. Given Karol’s
treatment, the coalition group is one-dimensional – political behavior is explicable based on only
one (or one set of) issue(s). In the context of the white evangelical affiliation with the GOP, the
group was invited into the Party exclusively on the basis of Christian issues. That is, Republican
elites incorporated white evangelicals by changing their stance or advocating new positions on
206
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social issues important to evangelicals such as abortion, ERA, and school prayer. However, this
explanation is limited. White evangelicals are not one-dimensional political actors, and they have
preferences on both Christian issues and non-Christian issues.
For example, a small, but substantial, number of white evangelicals mobilized in the GOP
in support of domestic anticommunist groups in the wake McCarthy’s campaign.209 Indeed, the
Party’s position as the traditional party of national unity and strength – and therefore its position
as the anticommunist party – attracted white evangelicals absent of direct appeals.210 This is
especially significant given white evangelicals opposition to communism. See Figure 3.3 for a
longitudinal analysis of white evangelical, total white, and the total population’s attitudes on
communism as the worst form of government.
Figure 3.3

Communism is the Worst Kind of Government,
1973-1994
80.0%
70.0%
White Evangelicals
60.0%

Total Whites
Total Population

50.0%
40.0%
1973 1976 1980 1984 1987 1989 1991 1994
Source: The General Social Survey, cumulative data file, 1973-1994.

Figure 3.3 demonstrates that beginning in the 1970s – both before and after widespread
affiliation with the Republican Party – white evangelicals were more likely to consider
209
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communism the worst form of government than both the white population and the total
population at large. As a result, it is not surprising that white evangelicals were attracted by the
GOP’s stance as the anti-communist Party. This is an important aspect of the story of
evangelical-GOP affiliation. Yet because it has little to do with GOP leaders shifting positions to
appeal to white evangelicals as a new constituency per Karol’s model, it is left out of the
analysis. Thus, it shows that the Karol group incorporation
model ignores the multidimensional preferences of white evangelicals and instead shows them as
one-dimensional Christian issue actors. A more complete picture of the white evangelical-GOP
affiliation would consider the evangelical support of the domestic anticommunism movement,
noting that this may help to explain the shift in partisan preferences of white evangelicals.
Similarly, white evangelicals had strong views on racial politics and civil rights
policymaking, which may have made the Republican Party a more attractive option. Given
Karol’s model, we would expect that racial politics had little effect on the affiliation because
GOP elites did not explicitly shift positions on race as to attract white evangelicals. However,
survey data shows that white evangelicals did in fact have opinions on racial matters. See Figure
3.4 and 3.5.
Figure 3.4 shows that in 1964, white evangelicals were more likely than general whites to
opine that civil rights pushes too fast, and remained dependably more conservative than both
total whites and the overall population on civil rights until
1992. Likewise, Figure 3.5 demonstrates that white evangelicals were more likely to prefer strict
segregation than both total whites and the total population through the 1960s
and 1970s. Because the Republican Party was the racially conservative party, it may not
be surprising that white evangelicals – who are more conservative than the overall white
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population on civil rights and segregation – chose to affiliate with the GOP.
Figure 3.4

Civil Rights Pushes Too Fast, 1964-1992
80.0%

60.0%
White Evangelicals
Total Whites
40.0%

Total Population

20.0%
1964

1968

1972

1976

1984

1988

1992

Source: The American National Election Studies, cumulative data file (1964-1992)

Figure 3.5

Prefer Strict Segregation, 1964-1978
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Source: The American National Election Studies, cumulative data file (1964-1978)

However, Karol’s model does not acknowledge that racial politics may have played a part in the
observed partisan affiliation. Akin to the case of opinion on communism, it is important not to
discount the role that the group’s opinions on political questions outside of traditional Christian
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issues played in the partisan affiliation calculus. Because Karol’s model ignores these aspects, it
is notably limited. A more complete explanation of partisan affiliation would account for
multidimensional preferences.
That being said, Karol’s argument provides a useful method of thinking about party
affiliation and is in many respects compelling. Clearly there was a top-down aspect to the white
evangelical-GOP affiliation. However, because Karol fails to account for the impact of foreign
affairs and racial politics, or other non-Christian issues on which white evangelicals advocated
distinct positions, his theory of incorporation is limited. White evangelicals, like all political
actors, have multidimensional preferences, and models of group incorporation should thus take
into account all variables that affected their political decisions. Political scientist Geoffrey
Layman at least partly accounts for this multidimensionality in his explanation of the
evangelical-GOP affiliation

The Politics of Race and the Bottom-Up Theory of Incorporation
Layman expands upon Hunter’s culture wars thesis. As noted in Chapter 2, term refers to
the notion that contemporary American society is fragmented between those with “orthodox” and
“progressive” religious and moral orientations.211 According to Hunter, the division manifests
itself as hostility between groups with different understandings of morality.212 Layman’s
argument reflects this conflict, applying the progressive-orthodox cultural divide to party
politics. In Layman’s words, “Cultural progressivism of the 1960s and 1970s and the orthodox
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response of the 1970s and 1980s drew the lines for a new form of American cultural conflict.”213
This new form of cultural conflict helps to explain the partisan changes during the latter half of
the 20th century.214 Consistent with the arguments presented in Chapter 2, increasingly secular
and modernist opinion in the 1960s and 1970s in many ways forced white evangelicals “out of
political hiding.”215 However this political coming out party for evangelicals, and their
subsequent affiliation with the GOP, was no immediate undertaking. Rather, it is perhaps better
described as a process of dealignment and realignment.216
As seen in Figure 3.2, beginning in 1964 and lasting through the mid-1970s, there was a
noticeable decline in the number of white evangelicals identifying with the Democratic Party.
For example, in 1964 over 60% of white evangelicals identified themselves as strongly
Democratic, weakly Democratic, or leaning Democratic. However by 1980 that number was
under 40%. As previously mentioned, evangelicals prior to the 1970s tended to weakly identify
with Democrats. Despite its weakness, this partisan preference suggests that there had some
reason for the loss in Democratic allegiance. According to Layman, Democratic cultural, racial,
and sexual liberalism pushed evangelicals to change their partisan identification.217 This partisan
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realignment is even more striking if we narrow the analysis to include only white evangelicals in
the South.
Figure 3.6

Southern White Evangelicals and Party
Identification, 1960-2008
80.0%
60.0%
Democrat

40.0%
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20.0%
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0.0%

Note: “Democratic” and “Republican” includes those who indicated they were leaning to the party in question.
South is defined per U.S. census regions: AL, AR, DE, D.C., FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, VA, WV, SC, TN,
OK, TX. Source: American National Election Studies, 1960-2008

Fewer than 30% of southern white evangelicals identified as Republicans in 1960; however, by
2008 that number was nearly 70%. This shift was at least in part caused by the fact that
beginning in the 1960s, the national parties and their candidates began to take distinct stands on
cultural issues, and liberal Democrats importantly dictated civil rights policymaking.218
There is a large literature that considers the creation and evolution of issues over time.
Political scientists Edward Carmines and James Stimson, in studying issue evolution, have
presented several hypotheses explaining why issues change. The most relevant of these
hypotheses is that of mass party realignments. According to Carmines and Stimson, the
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underlying cause of much party realignment is issue evolution.219 As I argued in Chapter 2, new
and newly salient issues in American politics became apparent in the 1960s as a result of a
changing cultural matrix, which led to the aforementioned Democratic cultural liberalism. Thus,
it becomes clear that there may be a direct connection between new issues and white evangelical
partisan realignment. As the authors point out, the “new lines of conflict [new political conflict
as a result of new issues] may alter the coalitional structure of the parties.”220 In this case, the
coalitional structure of the Republican Party expanded to include white evangelicals.
However, white evangelicals’ dealignment from the Democratic Party did not make for
an immediate affiliation with the GOP. Rather, as Layman and Hussey point out, “With the
Republican Party not yet presenting a clear culturally-conservative alternative, there may have
been stronger incentives for conservative Christians to leave the Democratic fold than for them
to identify with the GOP.”221 Therefore during a roughly ten-year period between the mid-1960s
and 1970s, evangelicals were in a state of political flux. Alienated by their traditional Democratic
allies, many struggled with the notion of switching political allegiance. Scholars have cited
alienation as a possible explanation for dealignment. Alienation literature suggests that social
change – of which there was no shortage during the 1960s and 1970s – creates large numbers of
citizens who reject their traditional social or political allegiances. These citizens then look for
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new institutions to align themselves with.222 This argument may apply to the case of white
evangelicals, who by the mid-1970s had begun to realign with the GOP.
A possible cause for the time lag between dealignment and realignment is the political
success of Jimmy Carter, president from 1976-1980, and white (Southern Baptist) evangelical
from Georgia. Despite his conservative religious beliefs, Carter was a political liberal, and a
politician who, at least outwardly, did not advocate the moral traditionalism of his religious
brethren. Nonetheless, Carter’s electoral success focused national attention on evangelicals, and
provided proof that by 1976, evangelicals were well on their way to politicization.223 Moreover,
Carter’s candidacy foreshadowed two important political developments with regards to white
evangelicals. First, it demonstrated to political elites that evangelicals had become a sizeable
voting bloc. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, Carter’s presence likely helped to break
down evangelicals’ longstanding apolitical tendencies.224 As a result, many white evangelicals
assumed that a Christian politician such as Carter would commit himself to opposing secular
humanism and promoting a return to traditional values. Accordingly, Carter benefitted from
many evangelical votes in the election of 1976.225 Yet rather than the socially conservative
stalwart evangelicals perhaps desired, Carter focused his religious beliefs on personal piety
rather than public morality, and, in the view of conservative evangelicals, “was on the wrong
side of the culture wars.”226 Consequently, white evangelicals became widely disenchanted with
the Carter administration. Not only did Carter advocate for the aforementioned IRS proposal to
require parochial schools to prove that they were not established to preserve segregation, but also
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the economy worsened during this presidency and stagflation caused political harm.227 The
existence of “one of their own” running for office may have discouraged evangelicals from
quickly changing their political allegiance. However when it became clear that Carter was
unwilling to incorporate an evangelical notion of morality in his policy initiatives, white
evangelicals seemed to recognize that the time had come to move away from their traditional,
albeit weak, loyalty to the Democratic Party.
Specifically, the literature points to 1978 – two years into Carter’s presidency – as the
year in which evangelical dealignment from the Democratic Party became realignment with the
GOP.228 However, during the 1960s-1970s it was not just white evangelicals moving out of the
Democratic Party and into the Republican Party – cultural and racial liberalism may have also
alienated conservative southern whites.229 Empirical evidence corroborates this claim. To begin
with, white evangelicals were historically (and remain today) located primarily in the South. See
Figures 3.7 and 3.8 for graphical representations of evangelical geographic location.
Both since 1960 (Figure 3.7) and today (Figure 3.8), we observe a concentration of
evangelicals in the South. This illustrates that the overwhelming number of white evangelicals in
the South may have followed other southern Whites out of the Democratic Party due to racial
and cultural liberalism. Consistent with this claim, partisan trends for southern white
evangelicals mirror those of southern whites.
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Figure 3.7

Distribution of White Evangelicals According to
Census Regions, 1960-2008
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Census regions defined as: Northeast (CT, ME, MA, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT), North Central (IL, IN, IA, KS, MI,
MN, MO, NE, ND, OH, WI, ND, SD), South (AL, AR, DE, D.C., FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, VA, WV, SC,
TN, OK, TX), and West (AK, AZ, CA, CO, HI, ID, MT, NV, NM, OR, UT, WA, WY). Source: American National
Election Studies, 1960-2008.

Figure 3.8: Rates of Evangelical Adherence by State per 1000 Population (2010)

Source: The ARDA – http://www.thearda.com/mapsReports/maps/Ardamap.asp?GRP=1&map1=6

See Figures 3.9 – 3.10 for partisanship of southern whites and southern white evangelicals. The
overall shape of the southern white evangelical graph parallels that of southern whites. By
placing the movement of white evangelicals into the GOP as part of a larger movement of
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Figure 3.9

Southern Whites and Party Identification,
1960-2008
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Note: “Democratic” and “Republican” includes those who indicated they were leaning to the party in question.
South is defined per U.S. census regions: AL, AR, DE, D.C., FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, VA, WV, SC, TN,
OK, TX. Source: American National Election Studies (1960-2008)

Figure 3.10

Southern White Evangelicals and Party
Identification, 1960-2008
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Note: “Democratic” and “Republican” includes those who indicated they were leaning to the party in question.
South is defined per U.S. census regions: AL, AR, DE, D.C., FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, VA, WV, SC, TN,
OK, TX. Source: American National Election Studies (1960-2008)
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southern whites from the Democratic to the Republican Parties, Layman’s explanation – and
more specifically its commentary on racial politics – makes an important distinction from
Karol’s group incorporation model.
Indeed, Layman’s explanation of white evangelical partisan preferences shows the group
as politically multidimensional. While white evangelicals have strong preferences on Christian
issues, the group also has policy preferences on other issues, such as racial politics and foreign
policy. According to Layman, the influence of secularism and cultural/racial liberalism within
the Democratic Party in the 1970s likely made the Republican Party a more attractive political
option for white evangelicals.230 This treatment portrays evangelicals as concerned with both
moral and racial liberalism, thereby providing a more complete explanation of the white
evangelical-GOP alignment.
Further, the role of racial policymaking in Layman’s account suggests that the impetus
for the evangelical-GOP affiliation seemingly lies more with group actors than political elites. As
it became clear that the Democratic Party would take liberal stances on social, cultural, and
moral issues, white evangelical actors began to mobilize in support of the GOP. As political
scientist Axel Schaffer points out in his study of evangelicals and the state, white evangelical
elites during the 1970s “developed a coherent political ideology, fostered ties to secular
conservatism, and sidelined evangelical liberals.”231 Undoubtedly, televangelists during the
1970s-1980s helped to achieve these ends. Thus at least part of the observed realignment towards
the GOP was motivated by group elites. In opposition to the overtly top-down nature of Karol’s
group incorporation model, in many ways Layman’s explanation suggests a bottom-up
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understanding of group-party affiliation.232 It is not that strategic political elites have no role in
the culture wars model, but rather that politicians often respond to the demands of a group as
opposed to a group responding to the invitation of a party.
However, like Karol’s model, Layman’s theory is compelling but suffers from
limitations. A more complete picture would provide more insight into the role of strategic
politicians in the dealignment and realignment processes, as well as more thorough discussions
of issue evolution literature and the role of foreign affairs in the party affiliation decision.

Problematizing Layman’s Model
Indeed, the culture wars explanation does not come without complications. In fact, as
Wilcox points out, “The culture-war idea oversimplifies the dimensions of conflict over social
and moral issues.”233 While it is true that those with progressive and orthodox worldviews differ
on cultural issues, it is also true that people with progressive only, or orthodox only, views differ
on these issues as well. Additionally, it would be wrong to assume that all secularists are hostile
to religion; in fact, most secular citizens turn out to be supportive of the rights of religious
expression.234 Thus, while there is clearly some cultural conflict in America, it is multifaceted
and complex, and white evangelicals represent only one dimension.235
To the same end, the cultural conflict Layman invokes is perhaps best seen as a
microcosm for a larger, and more nuanced, cultural division in society. As Wuthnow makes
clear, “the heritage of fundamentalism and modernism has provided only a starting point for the
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present [cultural] division [in American society].”236 In other words, the culture wars hypothesis
oversimplifies not only the conflict itself but also its frame. To cleanly divide American society
into only two groups – those with purely orthodox or purely progressive moral outlooks –
generalizes what are in fact nuanced disagreements. Moreover, Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope
suggest in their aptly titled critique of the culture wars hypothesis, Culture War? The Myth of a
Polarized America, that party polarization along religious lines may be a fallacy.237 In providing
empirical evidence problematizing the culture wars theory, the authors argue that most
Americans lie in the middle of the spectrum on social issues.238 Therefore, most Americans do
not exhibit ideological constraint; rather, most see some issues in an orthodox (conservative)
light and others in a progressive (liberal) light. This suggests that religious differences may not
provide a complete explanation for party polarization, complicating Layman’s argument.
Further, the culture wars explanation for group incorporation discounts the role of party
elites in the incorporation process. As I have argued, Nixon, and later and more importantly
Reagan, appealed to white evangelicals by incorporating white evangelical elites into their
administrations as well as changing their positions on social issues. Additionally, it was not just
presidents – GOP elites of the New Right worked to incorporate white evangelicals into the
Republican coalition. It thus becomes clear that Hunter’s culture wars hypothesis, and Layman’s
repurposing of it, may over-generalize (and perhaps over-emphasize, according to Fiorina,
Abrams, and Pope) cultural conflict and its impact on American society.
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Top-Down and Bottom-Up? Karol, Layman, and the Evangelical-GOP Affiliation
Layman’s explanation of group-party affiliation offers a substantial deviation from
Karol’s group incorporation framework. The top-down model suggests that white evangelicals’
incorporation into the Republican Party can explained almost exclusively by political
entrepreneurship on the part of GOP elites. Indeed, the strategic choices of Nixon, Reagan, and
other GOP elites between 1964-1980 undoubtedly help to explain the movement of the
Republican Party to incorporate evangelicals. Yet this hypothesis is problematic in that it does
not account for the politics of anticommunism, race, or other political issues that likely had some
effect on the partisan choice of white evangelicals. Conversely, Layman’s culture-wars
explanation acknowledges some political multidimensionality of white evangelicals, but is
limited in that it may over-generalize, and its emphasis on evangelical actors discounts the role
that political elites played in the incorporation. By the mid-1970s, socially conservative
evangelicals, alienated by the Democratic Party based on the politics of race, school prayer, and
other cultural issues, had organized into a self-aware political group. When it came to choosing a
political party they drifted towards the GOP. There is little doubt that there was a top-down
aspect to this partisan decision; however, at least part of the incorporation process can and should
be described as bottom-up, coming from evangelical actors seeking political representation.
Both explanations offer compelling points that should not be ignored. In fact, the two
processes need not be mutually exclusive. In order to most completely understand the
evangelical-GOP affiliation, they should be taken into account together. Karol’s coalition group
incorporation model undoubtedly captures part of the process by which white evangelicals came
to be associated with the GOP, and the same is true of Layman’s hypothesis grounded in partisan
dealignment and realignment. However, this presents a chicken and egg problem. If the process
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is self-reinforcing – and it seems likely that it is – then the question, “Which occurred first?”
becomes important. Given a top-down interpretation, GOP elites first appealed to white
evangelical voters, thereby encouraging them to re-think their ties to the Democratic Party and
realign with the GOP. On the other hand, the bottom-up explanation implies that evangelical
actors looked to the Republicans as a result of the group’s alienation at the hands of Democratic
social, racial, and cultural liberalism, and GOP elites responded by incorporating the new
constituency. Yet if the processes occurred simultaneously, this circularity is irrelevant.
Additionally, because the two explanations, on their own, suffer from limitations, neither could,
unaided, offer a complete explanation of how and why a majority of white evangelicals became
Republicans by the 1980s. The top-down incorporation model is predicated on the fact that a
bloc of voters – in this case, white evangelicals – became politically alienated and/or dissatisfied.
This implies action on the part of evangelical actors, undermining the possibility that a top-down
explanation could stand alone. Analogously, the bottom-up model describes not just group
actors, but also their relationship with party elites. Thus the two processes needed one another.
During the 1960s-1980s, GOP elites wanted to expand their electoral coalition and conservative
evangelicals needed a political home. Both sides moved toward the shared goal, and the result –
the partisan affiliation between white evangelicals and the Republican Party – has undoubtedly
helped to shape the contemporary American political landscape.
After affiliation, the question becomes what changed as a result of the incorporation. In
the next chapter, I will assess how white evangelical opinion changed after being widely
incorporated into the GOP, focusing specifically on fiscal policy preferences. In doing so, I will
propose a party affiliation effect that helps to explain contemporary white evangelical fiscal
conservatism.
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Chapter 4: Toward a Party Affiliation Explanation
of White Evangelical Opinion Change
As noted in Chapter 3, we do not observe a consistent partisan affiliation over time on the
part of white evangelicals. A largely nonpartisan, group until the 1970s, white evangelicals only
in recent memory became a key constituency of the GOP. I have argued that political
entrepreneurship on the part of GOP elites and both Democratic and Republican position taking
were key components to this alignment. Throughout American history, and through partisan
change, white evangelical opinion on social issues has remained dependably conservative and
traditionalist. Indeed, morality was central in each of the three waves of evangelical political
activity in the 20th century.239 The 1920s antievolution in schools and Scopes trial politicization
saw evangelicals objecting to the teaching of secular humanism in public schools – clearly a
moral concern. Again during the 1950s anticommunism mobilization, evangelicals organized
against communist atheism. Arguably communism is more an economic issue than a moral one;
however, white evangelicals did not see it as such. Rather, to many evangelicals, communism
became synonymous with godlessness, and was viewed as an ideology that threatened the
evangelical (and, in their eyes, American) belief system.240 The final wave of evangelical
political activism – the 1970s-present – is likely best seen as, at least in part, a rejection of
growing cultural liberalism and the leftward drift of public opinion on salient social issues.241
The consistency between the three politicizations helps to establish the centrality of moral
concerns to white evangelical political activity.
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However, white evangelical opinion on issues pertaining to political economy (so-called
economic issues) has been more volatile, and far less predictable. During the early 20th century,
American evangelicalism was defined by populist political causes. As I have discussed, William
Jennings Bryan was not only an observant evangelical, but also an economic populist and a
reformer influential in the movements to ban alcohol and to secure women’s suffrage.242
Moreover, the section in The Fundamentals of Faith devoted to “Christian socialism” illustrates
the fiscally liberal disposition of many early 20th century evangelicals.243 This contrasts with the
conventional wisdom, first conceived by Max Weber in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism, that there is a connection between conservative Protestant theology and
capitalism.244 Yet, contemporary political scientists seem to side with Weber. As Wilson points
out, “The dominant view among modern scholars is that evangelicalism is associated with a
greater propensity to endorse capitalism and be suspicious of the welfare state.”245 This conflict
illustrates the difficulty in explaining contemporary white evangelical fiscal conservatism.
I argue that white evangelical opinion on economic issues is more complex than the
conventional wisdom suggests. Though a primary motivation of affiliation with the GOP was
social issues and moral concerns, contemporary white evangelicals, especially at the elite level,
tend to advocate both social and fiscal conservatism. Scholarly explanations of this inclination
generally emphasize either theology or a rise in socioeconomic status. I will problematize each
of these explanations, demonstrating that a more complete picture of white evangelical fiscal

242

See Kazin, A Godly Hero: The Life of William Jennings Bryan.
Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture: 118-23.
244
Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Stephen Kalberg (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2011).
245
J. Matthew Wilson, "Religion and American Public Opinion: Economic Issues," in The Oxford Handbook of
Religion and American Politics, ed. Corwin E. Smidt, Lyman A. Kellstedt, and James L. Guth (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2009), 195.
243

82

policy preferences would, in addition to considering theology and socioeconomic status, also
take into account the effect of affiliation with the fiscally conservative Republican Party.
I propose a causal relationship between rising partisanship in the GOP and conservative
opinions on fiscal policy and social welfare issues. That is, I argue that the effects of widespread
affiliation with the Republican Party help to explain why evangelical political economy issue
preferences were less ambiguous – and more liberal – prior to the 1950s than they were during
the latter half of the 20th century. More specifically, I echo noted public opinion scholarship in
proposing that partisanship permeates the many dimensions of political decision making.
Empirically consistent with this theoretical party affiliation effect, I find that white evangelical
opinion on fiscal policy and social welfare began to drift towards the GOP status quo during the
1980s.

Problematizing the Conventional Wisdom
Substantial scholarship suggests that white evangelicals tend to be oriented towards a
market-liberal, individualist ideology and fiscally conservative policy preferences. Theoretically,
this implies that the connection between religious and political conservatism goes beyond
cultural issues and into social welfare and fiscal policy preferences.246 For example, Wilcox,
Jelen, and Leege show that people who identify as “evangelical,” “fundamentalist,” or
“charismatic” are less likely to support economic policies favoring the poor or reducing
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poverty.247 More convincingly, political scientists Barker and Carman demonstrate in a
comprehensive empirical study that conservative evangelicalism (what the authors refer to as
“doctrinarian” Protestantism) shapes attitudes on questions of political economy. According to
the authors, the results, “provide indirect support for Weber’s classic thesis,” and, “indicate that
white doctrinarians may influence the balance of public opinion beyond the cultural/social realm,
thus providing support for individualist economic policies.”248 This conclusion is echoed by
several empirically grounded studies of white evangelical fiscal and social welfare policy
preferences.249
Moreover, many contemporary white evangelical leaders advocate a strictly marketliberal ideology. For example, Ralph Reed, as leader of the Christian Coalition, announced in
1993 that middle-class tax cuts would become central to the group’s political agenda. Further,
Reed and his followers supported the abolition of the minimum wage, the privatization of the
welfare system, and large spending cuts in Medicaid and other entitlement programs during the
mid-1990s.250 By this time, the economic agenda of Reed, the Christian Coalition, and its
members lined up with the pro-market, pro-business policies of the GOP.
However, noting the contemporary policy preferences of white evangelicals does little in
the way of explaining how the group came to have these preferences. As I have shown, the
origins of the Protestant fundamentalist movement in America were connected to an ideal closer
to Christian socialism than Christian capitalism. Consequently, the observation that white
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evangelicals today tend to prefer conservative positions on fiscal policy and social welfare raises
the question of how they got there, especially given the historical leftism of American
evangelicalism.
Political scientist David Leege offers a characteristic example of the status quo
explanation of white evangelical fiscal and social welfare conservatism. He claims that white
evangelicals, once politically mobilized, embraced conservative economic positions as a result of
“their disdain for the dependent poor (grounded in Calvinist ethic) and their rapid upward
mobility (a traditional SES explanation.)”251 Most scholarly explanations follow Leege’s
treatment, falling into one of two categories. The first is theological in nature. As previously
mentioned, there is a substantial literature suggesting that conservative Protestant doctrine
encourages support of market-liberal ideology, beginning with Weber. This literature argues that
white evangelicals tend to favor fiscal conservatism on the basis of Calvinist individualism. The
second concerns a rise in socioeconomic status. In short, as white evangelicals became more
affluent, they also became more likely to support fiscally conservative policy positions. I will
consider each of these explanations and point out limitations and inconsistencies in both.

Evangelical Theology and Capitalism
As previously mentioned, some scholars suggest that evangelical doctrine urges
adherents to endorse a market-liberal ideology, thereby explaining white evangelical fiscal
conservatism. Perhaps most famously, Weber suggests that the Calvinist foundation of
conservative Protestantism is related to capitalist ideology.252 In short, because salvation is
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predetermined in Calvinist doctrine, Calvinists believed that individual piety was illustrative of
depth of faith and therefore paramount to the relationship with God. As a result, individualism
became a central tenant of Calvinism.
This greatly influenced evangelical thought – although not always Calvinist in the
strictest sense, evangelicals today share much of Calvinism’s legalism and individualism.253
According to sociologists Tamney, Burton, and Johnson, white evangelicals make up the
strongest supporters of Calvinist (individualist) ideology.254 As a result, many contemporary
evangelicals read New Testament passages hinting at individualism as endorsements of marketliberal ideology. Specifically, many point to Acts 2:44-45:
And all that believed were together, and had all things in common; And sold their
possessions and goods, and parted them to all men, as every man had need.
According to Summit Ministries, an evangelical educational institution cited by Wilcox, this
verse is interpreted to imply that “when modern capitalism is practiced with a heart, it showers
blessings of wealth, generosity, good will, and happy living on every community it touches.”255
Because evangelicals see the world as fraught with sin, it is not only unjust but also immoral to
distribute wealth equally among those who deserve and those who are sinful.256 Similarly, many
evangelicals reject entitlement programs, arguing that they have a tendency to “discriminate
against the hardworking while they reward the slothful.”257 Evangelical institutions have thus
publicly aligned themselves with a market-liberal ideology. As economist Laurence Iannaccone
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explains, the “intellectual and biblical defense of free enterprise ‘Christian economics” is the
primary goal of institutions such as the Contemporary Economics and Business Association
(CEBA) at Falwell’s Liberty University.258 CEBA is only one of several evangelical
organizations that attempt to blur the lines between economic ideology and biblical literalism.
These viewpoints provide context to the argument that many contemporary white evangelicals
reject an ideal of economic equality on theological grounds.
Moreover, many white evangelical leaders have embraced the notion of “Christian
capitalism.” This places the free-market institution as a “God-given system” and equates selfinterest with sin in order to explain the sinful nature of humankind. That is, if all people are selfinterested, they will act to maximize their personal profit, which, to many conservative
evangelicals, is God’s way of keeping man grounded and hardworking (given this ideology, the
danger of socialism is laziness.)259 The “Christian World View of Economics,” a paper published
by the economics committee of the Coalition on Revival (CoR), provides insight into
conservative evangelical attitudes concerning economic issues.260 For example:
We affirm that a free market economy is the closest approximation man has yet devised
in this fallen world to the economy set forth in the Bible.
We deny that central planning and other coercive interferences with personal choice can
increase the productivity of society; that the civil government has authority to set the
value of property, and that the Bible teaches any “just” price other than that resulting
from the interaction of supply and demand in a marketplace of free people.261
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This viewpoint highlights a theological justification for fiscal conservatism. Echoing the CoR,
white evangelical leaders often cite the respected scholarship of Milton Friedman and Friedrich
Hayek when discussing economics and fiscal policy.262 In doing so, leaders offer biblical and
theological support to an ideology grounded in individualism and fiscal conservatism.
The ideological commitment to Christian capitalism is further visible in the “Prosperity
Gospel” – the evangelical doctrine that God wants people to be prosperous, especially
financially. According to Bradley Koch in his 2009 dissertation on the Prosperity Gospel and
voting, advocates believe that wealth is a sign of God’s blessing and compensation for faith,
prayer, and giving beyond the minimum tithe to one’s church. Furthermore, because adherents
interpret the New Testament to show Jesus as rich, Propensity followers argue that people should
live lavishly and flaunt wealth. According to this logic, poverty is a sign of God’s disfavor and
lack of faith.263 Perhaps the most famous contemporary preacher of the Prosperity Gospel,
televangelist Joel Osteen, states that, “God wants to increase you financially,” and “the only
place in the Bible [Malachi 3:10-12] where God tells us to prove him – which means to test Him,
or check Him out – is in the area of our finances.”264 Clearly, the Propensity Gospel is consistent
with arguments that evangelical theology lends itself to Christian capitalism and preferences for
fiscal and social welfare conservatism.
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Additional scholarship corroborates the contention that white evangelicals are
theologically predisposed to a market-liberal ideology. For example, historian Walter Trattner
explains that some evangelicals see poverty and damnation as individual matters, and thus only
the individual can overcome them.265 Moreover, Smith points out that evangelicals tend to prefer
“relational” approaches to charity, and emphasize the efforts of congregations and/or individuals
over impersonal institutions, such as government programs.266 Similarly, Johnstone argues that
evangelical opposition to communism stems from an emphasis on individual salvation in
evangelical thought.267 This literature highlights the transferability of individualism from
evangelical theology to market-liberal ideology. Given this line of reasoning, white evangelicals’
religious and the political views reinforce one another.268
Historian Bethany Moreton argues that this led to distinct pro-business tendencies. In her
To Serve God and Wal-Mart, Moreton traces the evolution of an evangelical-led pro-business
movement, arguing that a “Christian service ethos powered capitalism.”269 This helps to
contextualize contemporary white evangelical fiscal policy preferences. However, not all
scholarship agrees on the link between evangelical theology and market-liberalism, pro-business
tendencies, or fiscal conservatism.

Evangelical Theology and Redistributive Politics
Indeed, emphasis on the individual may not be as foundational to evangelical doctrine as
the above literature would have us believe. While some evangelicals may associate individualism
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in the New Testament with an ideology of political economy, others connect evangelical
theology to redistributive policy preferences. Although as Wilson points out, this is a minority
view in the literature, it is not insignificant.270 To begin with, there is a robust tradition within
conservative Christianity defined by taking from each person according to ability and giving
based on need.271 Political scientist Stephen Hart’s 1992 study contends that evangelicalism may
in fact encourage leftism on economic issues.272 Correspondingly, Wilson argues that the strong
emphasis on justice for the poor in the Old Testament and in the gospels provides some
plausibility to the belief that evangelicalism contributes to leftist positions on the economy.273 As
it turns out, measuring evangelical attitudes toward the poor paints a far more complicated
picture of evangelical opinion on wealth redistribution than supporters of Weber’s conventional
wisdom might assume.
Although few longitudinal analyses of white evangelical opinion on income distribution
exist, some “snapshots” show evangelicals to be more liberal than the conventional wisdom
assumes.274 For example, sociologist Timothy Clydesdale finds that evangelicals favor
government efforts to eradicate poverty more readily than biblical moderates or liberals.275
Moreover, Putnam and Campbell show that nearly 60% of white evangelicals polled in a 2006
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survey believed that the government should care for the poor.276 These findings contrast sharply
with the individualist understanding of white evangelical economic thought. If a theological
commitment to individualism shapes market-liberal ideology, we would expect evangelicals to
consider poverty an individual matter. However, some measures of evangelical attitudes on
poverty indicate that adherents are in fact more likely to want to help the poor than other
religious groups, especially when poverty is seen as the result of bad luck as opposed to laziness
or other factors. For example, Wuthnow’s 1994 study finds a positive correlation among
evangelicals between the propensity to support the poor and frequency of church attendance.277
Iannaccone further problematizes the view of white evangelicals as economic conservatives in
his 1991 study, finding that “evangelical-fundamentalists” are nearly as likely as other groups to
advocate increased expenditures on health, poverty, education, and the environment.”278
Likewise, in a 1989 study, Tamney, Johnson, and Burton argue that when it comes to economic
restructuring – income redistribution and job and income guarantees – evangelicals are actually
more liberal than other demographic groups.279 The findings complicate the notion of a
theological coherence between evangelicals and market-liberal ideology. This leads Tamney and
Johnson to conclude their study of Moral Majority supporters with the suggestion that William
Jennings Bryan “seems a more apt personification of Protestant fundamentalism than does Jerry
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Falwell.”280 This observation runs counter to the prevailing conventional wisdom of evangelicals
and opinion on issues pertaining to political economy. It is important to note, however, that
because these studies offer only snapshots in time, they do not necessarily suggest that
evangelicals are economic liberals. What these studies do imply is that theology may not be
compelling as an explanation for white evangelical fiscal conservatism. Indeed, if theology is to
explain white evangelical opinion on economic issues, it is not clear to which ideological (or
partisan, for that matter) direction evangelical theology points. This lack of clarity is exacerbated
in considering William Jennings Bryan, his many political and religious followers, and the
history of evangelicalism in America.
Bryan and the many fervent evangelicals of the early 20th century who made it their
mission to fight big business, eradicate poverty, and find economic justice help to contextualize
the shift in white evangelical opinion on fiscal policy and social welfare issues. Indeed, this
history, coupled with some contemporary findings that white evangelicals tend to be more
concerned with eradicating poverty than the population at large, importantly complicates the
conventional wisdom. What becomes clear is that there is no apparent theological link between
evangelical doctrine and an ideology of political economy, whether conservative or liberal.
While for some adherents the individualistic nature of evangelical biblical interpretation and
view of salvation shapes a market-liberal ideology, others focus on the Social Gospel and are
largely committed to redistributive economic policies. As Campbell, Layman, and Green assert
in discussing this very topic, “it is not obvious what a belief in authoritative scripture means for
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one’s opinions regarding the capital gains tax.”281 Thus, there is substantial uncertainty as to the
role of theology in shaping the fiscal policy preferences of white evangelicals.282 As a result,
theology as an explanation for white evangelical conservative opinion on matters of political
economy is incomplete at best.

Status Politics
After theology, the second argument widely made in the literature explaining white
evangelical fiscal conservatism highlights the rise in socioeconomic status of the group.
According to this literature, as the socioeconomic stature of white evangelicals rose during the
1960s-1990s group opinion on political economy issues shifted to the right. For example, Wald
and Calhoun-Brown characteristically assert that, “Evangelical Christians, who have experienced
considerable upward mobility in the past forty years, are less inclined to support an expansion of
the government’s role in society.”283 This reasoning has received considerable support as an
explanation of white evangelical opinion on fiscal policy and social welfare.
There is little empirical doubt that white evangelicals have indeed experienced upward
mobility in the last half-century. For example, in their paper on the social status of American
Christians, Park and Reimer illustrate that both the educational attainment and income of white
evangelicals have increased since the 1972.284 In terms of income, the study finds that white
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evangelicals exhibit comparatively high levels of intracohort individual increase, implying that
the group is “catching up” to other religious groups.285 Likewise, despite being historically
uneducated compared to other groups, the educational attainment of white evangelicals over time
has increased leading the authors to suggest a convergence among religious groups.286
Sociologists Roof and McKinney echo this finding, demonstrating a striking increase in
educational achievement of the group. Whereas in 1960 only 7% of members of evangelical and
fundamentalist denominations had attended some college, by the mid-1970s 23% had attended
some college.287 Massengil further explains this trend, showing that only 10% of white
evangelicals born before 1940 achieved a bachelor’s degree by age 25. However, of those born
between 1960 and 1979, 21% had received a bachelor’s degree by age 25. 288 Massengil’s results
are adapted in Figure 4.1 (below, page 102). These increases serve as clear empirical measures of
a rise in social status enjoyed by white evangelicals in the latter half of the 20th century.
Guth, Jelen, Kellstedt, Smidt, and Wald interpret these findings to suggest that white
evangelical Protestants increasingly moved into urban areas and middle-class occupations and
incomes, and more generally into positions of social and political prominence within their
communities during the late 20th century.289 This implies that as white evangelicals’
socioeconomic status increased, the group moved into the middle class prompting widespread
opinion change on economic issues. Corroborating this viewpoint, sociologist D. Michael
Lindsay’s Faith in the Halls of Power examines the rise of a white evangelical elite, and
documents the movement of white evangelicals into positions of power in politics and business
285
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between the 1970s and early 2000s. Lindsay contends that the emergence of this elite helped to
shift evangelical opinion towards pro-business policy preferences, and additionally affirmed to
many white evangelicals that individual piety and hard work, not the government, was the
primary factor in social mobility.290 While these arguments are in many respects attractive –
white evangelicals did experience increases in both educational attainment and average income
between the 1970s and 2000s – they in fact come up short upon further examination.
Figure 4.1

Whites Receiving a Bachelor's Degree by Age 25 by
Religious Group, 1974-2004
80.0%
Born Before 1940
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Source: General Social Survey 1974-2004. Adapted from Massengil, “Educational Attainment and Cohort Change
Among Conservative Protestants, 1972–2004," 550.

Although it is true that white evangelical educational attainment has risen in the last halfcentury, the group remains both uneducated and poor relative to other groups. Although Park and
Reimer assert that religious groups are converging in terms of social status measures, white
evangelicals remain near the bottom of the pack on most metrics. For example, Figure 4.1 shows
for the educational attainment of white evangelicals against other major religious groups.
Because evangelicals have consistently attained lower educational achievement than other
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religious groups since 1974, the fact remains that evangelicals are relatively uneducated as an
American religious group.
If religious traditions in America are indeed converging, they are at a slow rate;
furthermore, the relative position of each group on most measures has remained constant since
the 1970s. For example, Park and Reimer demonstrate that between 1972 and 1998, mainline
Protestants and Catholics were consistently both more educated and had higher total family
incomes than white evangelicals and black evangelicals, despite nominal increases of all
groups.291 Roof and McKinney reflect this complication, showing white evangelicals to be
among the least educated and poorest of all major American religious denominations.292 The
maintenance of the status quo may be a result of the general upward trend in educational
achievement across all groups. Thus it seems difficult to argue that a rise in socioeconomic status
led to a change in opinion on economic issues given that the group remains relatively worse off
than other religious groups. As white evangelicals have remained comparatively uneducated and
poor, we would expect the group to prefer fiscal policies that help them become less uneducated
and less poor. Because we do not observe these preferences, socioeconomic status explanations
of white evangelical fiscal policy preferences may be limited. Indeed, relative status is more
important than absolute status gains when considering policy preferences.
This is further evident in that correcting for income does not change white evangelical
fiscally conservative preferences. That is, if white evangelicals became more conservative on
economic issues as they got richer, we would expect poor white evangelicals to prefer liberal
policies and rich white evangelicals to prefer conservative policies. However, income groups do
not show substantial differences.
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Figure 4.2

White Evangelicals: We Should Let the Free
Market Handle the Economy, Income Adjusted,
1990-2008
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Income groups are defined by: bottom third (0-33 percentile), middle third (34-66 percentile) and top third (67-99
percentile). Source: American National Election Studies, 1990-2008

Figure 4.3

White Evangelicals: Government in Washington
is Too Strong, Income Adjusted, 1970-2000
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Income groups are defined by: bottom third (0-33 percentile), middle third (34-66 percentile) and top third (67-99
percentile). Source: American National Election Studies, 1970-2000

The relative consistency between the bottom and top third of the income distribution on political
economy and size of government questions as seen in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 further illustrates the
limitations of socioeconomic status explanations of white evangelical fiscal conservatism.
This parallels the difficulty in explaining white evangelical opinion on economic issues
via theology. Thus the conventional wisdom, as outlined both by Wilson and Leege (cited
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above), turns out to be incomplete. Whereas theology is limited because there is as much
evidence to assume that white evangelicals would be conservative as they would be liberal on
fiscal policy issues, socioeconomic status is also unconvincing because white evangelicals,
despite nominal gains, remain comparatively low. As a result, I suggest an additional
contributing factor in explaining white evangelical market-liberal ideology: the effect of
affiliation with the fiscally conservative Republican Party.

The Effect of Party Affiliation on White Evangelical Opinion Change
Contemporary white evangelicals, especially at the elite level, tend to prefer fiscally
conservative policies. However, given the (fiscally liberal) historical legacy of evangelicalism in
America and the complications in attributing these preferences to either theology or
socioeconomic status, why white evangelicals tend to be fiscal and social welfare conservatives
remains unclear. Echoing the noted political scientists and public opinion scholars Angus
Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, I argue that the effect of party
affiliation helps to explain white evangelical fiscal and social welfare conservatism. The classic
The American Voter explains this viewpoint:
If party identification deeply influences the partisan character of a field of psychological
forces, it will also have marked effects on the internal consistency of the field. Our
conception of the role of partisan loyalties leads us to expect this result. Identification
with a party raises a perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what is
favorable to his partisan orientation. The stronger the party bond, the more exaggerated
the process of selection and perceptual distortion will be.293
The claim that individuals see what is favorable to their party “through a perceptual screen” is
critical to understanding the effect of partisan affiliation. However, the authors of The American
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Voter were not the first to observe an effect of partisan affiliation on issue preferences. Rather,
that distinction can likely be claimed by Martin Van Buren.
In his famed 1827 letter to Thomas Ritchie, Van Buren suggested that bringing together
northern Republicans and southern planters could reconstitute the Republican Party. Specifically,
Van Buren believed that, “Party attachment in former times furnished a complete antidote for
sectional preferences by producing counteracting feelings. … It [party attachment] can and ought
to be revived and the proposed convention would be eminently serviceable in effecting that
object.”294 Van Buren understood that the effect of partisan affiliation would be strong enough to
mitigate the differences between northern Republicans and slave-owning southern planters.
Campbell et al. echo this same logic more than a century later in proposing a “perceptual screen”
through which voters see what is beneficial for their party.
Additional public opinion scholarship has reiterated these claims. For example, Stokes
emphasizes the “capacity of party identification to color perceptions,” while more recently Zaller
asserts that, “people tend to accept what is congenial to their partisan values and reject what is
not.”295 These observations point to an important theoretical conclusion: there is some impact of
partisanship on issue position taking and political ideology. Indeed, recent work by political
scientist Larry Bartels not only corroborates this perspective, but also provides evidence that
partisanship has a “powerful and pervasive impact on perceptions of political events.”296
Consistent with these arguments, I propose an analytical framework that examines white
evangelical opinion on political economy issues over time. This analysis allows me to comment
294

Martin Van Buren, "Letter to Thomas Ritchie," in The Age of Jackson, ed. Robert V. Remini (Columbia, S.C.:
The University of South Carolina Press, 1972).
295
Donald E. Stokes, "Party Loyalty and the Liklihood of Deviating Elections," in Elections and the Political
Order, ed. Angus Campbell, et al. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966), 166; Zaller, The Nature and Origins of
Mass Opinion: 241.
296
Larry M. Bartels, "Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political Perceptions," Political Behavior 24, no.
2 (2002): 120.

99

on the effect of partisanship on opinion change. As most studies supporting the conventional
wisdom explanations offer only snapshots in time, I suggest longitudinal analysis as a more
effective mode of assessing white evangelical fiscal policy preferences. Although there are
complications in manipulating survey data to show ideology on economic issues, there is
sufficient evidence to consider party affiliation a key factor in understanding white evangelical
opinion on fiscal policy issues. I find that as white evangelicals increasingly became Republicans
beginning in the late 1970s (due largely to their positions on social/moral issues), white
evangelical opinions moved toward GOP positions on fiscal and social welfare policy. It is
important to note that I do not assert that all white evangelicals are fiscally conservative or
oriented towards a market-liberal ideology. Rather, both rank and file white evangelicals and
group leaders endorse a wide range of economic beliefs.297 With this in mind, it is possible to
identify trends in survey data over time that point towards party affiliation as a critical element of
group opinion change and establish a link between rising partisanship within the GOP and
conservative opinion on questions of fiscal policy and social welfare.

The Evidence
If there was a causal relationship between rising partisanship in the GOP and opinion
change on fiscal policy and social welfare, we would expect a rightward movement of white
evangelical opinion on these questions beginning in the 1970s and intensifying through the
1980s and 1990s. More specifically, we would expect to see liberal or moderate opinions before
the mid-1970s, more closely aligning with the Democratic Party, and later a move towards the
GOP status quo through the 1980s and 1990s. Longitudinal analyses of white Democrats, white
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Republicans, and white evangelicals on select fiscal policy/social welfare issues (Figures 4.4-4.8)
empirically support this expectation.
Figure 4.4

Government Should Stay Out of Providing Assistance
With Medical Care, 1960-2008
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Source: The American National Election Studies, cumulative data file, 1960-2008. Note the response-coding change
in 1968. See Appendix for specific question wording and coding information.

Figure 4.5

Government Should Let Each Person Get Ahead On
Their Own (Jobs), 1960-2008
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Source: The American National Election Studies, cumulative data file, 1960-2008. Note the response-coding change
in 1968. See Appendix for specific question wording and coding information.
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Figure 4.6

Government Should Not Reduce Income Differences,
1978-2010
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Source: The General Social Survey, cumulative data file, 1978-2010

Figure 4.7

Government Does Too Much, 1975-2010
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Figure 4.8

People Should Help Themselves to Improve Their
Standard of Living, 1975-2010
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Source: The General Social Survey, cumulative data file, 1975-2010

These data help to contextualize the rightward drift of white evangelical opinion on fiscal
policy and social welfare issues. To varying degrees, each figure presented demonstrates that
since the 1970s, white evangelicals have tended to move toward white Republicans, although we
do not observe complete convergence. This suggests some influence of partisan affiliation on
white evangelical opinion formation. That being said, I do not claim that this relationship is
causal. Causality in political science is notoriously difficult to prove, and this analysis is likely
too rudimentary to draw causal conclusions. Rather, it may be necessary to perform more
advanced methods of hypothesis testing in order to show a causal relationship. However, lack of
causality does not render the analysis useless. Consistent with the qualitative framework
proposed by Campbell et al., Stokes, and Bartels echoing Van Buren’s intuition, empirical
evidence suggests that partisanship influences opinion.

103

Discussion
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show that during the 1960s, white evangelical opinions on economic
policy were closer to those of white Democrats than white Republicans. Because during this time
white evangelicals were only beginning to dealign from the Democratic Party, this observation is
unsurprising. As previously mentioned, to the extent that they were politicized, 1960s white
evangelicals tended to focus on social and foreign policy (anticommunism) issues.298 From a
fiscal policy/social welfare perspective, however, the group remained largely moderate to
slightly left leaning. Indeed, the primarily white evangelical supporters of the “Christian
anticommunism crusade” expressed progressive views on political economy issues. For example,
Wilcox finds that white supporters of the Christian anticommunist movement were more likely
than non-supporters both to agree that government should help ensure a bottom living standard
and to support Medicare.299 This is consistent with the data presented in Figure 4.4, showing that
in 1960 only 20% of white evangelicals believed that government should stay out of providing
assistance with medical care. While the crusade (and its predominantly white evangelical
following) was conservative in its socio-moral agenda, the movement did not necessarily
advocate fiscally conservative preferences. However, the 1970s began to change that status quo.
As I argued in Chapter 2, Americans both politically and culturally reacted to the changes and
upheaval of the 1960s, with profound implications for white evangelicals.300 As historian Bruce
Schulman points out, the 1970s saw a “thorough southernization” of American life, and white
evangelicals were at the heart of this regional and cultural shift.301 As we would expect based on
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the party affiliation effect logic, white evangelical positions on political economy issues began to
drift toward GOP positions during the 1970s.
Several primarily white evangelical organizations came out against Carter, arguing that
he had not “lived up to his duty as a Christian” by avoiding salient issues such as pro-choice
abortion policy and the separation of church and state.302 White evangelicals thus supported
Reagan, at least partially as a result of his promises of social conservatism, tax cuts, higher
defense spending, and commitment to traditional values.303 As historians Earl and Merle Black
point out in their volume on southern Republicanism, “On issues of primary concern to religious
conservatives – opposition to abortion and support for school prayer in pubic schools – the
Republican platform and candidate were much closer to their own views than were Carter and
the Democratic Party.”304 Although it was likely his commitment to traditionalism that attracted
white evangelicals, Figures 4.4-4.8 demonstrate that the group also seemed to begin to buy into
Reagan’s economic plan. By 1984, white evangelicals were consistently closer to white
Republicans than they had been in the early 1970s.
The rightward drift of white evangelical opinion on fiscal policy/social welfare coincides
with Reagan’s rise as a politician who was sympathetic to white evangelical social
conservatism.305 While white evangelicals likely aligned with Reagan and the GOP on the basis
of socio-moral issues, they also began to adhere to Reagan’s (and the Republican Party’s)
prescriptions for the economy. As Morone points out, Reagan “scorned the Social Gospel and its
302

Allitt, Religion in America Since 1945: A history: 152-53. For example, in 1979 the Moral Majority spoke out
against Carter and endorsed Reagan
303
Lichtman, White Protestant Nation: The Rise of the American Conservative Movement: 350-51. See Chapter 3
for a more in-depth discussion.
304
Earl Black and Merle Black, The Rise of Southern Republicans (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
2002). 214.
305
See Chapter 3. For example, Mason, The Republican Party and American Politics from Hoover to Reagan: 25658. See also Layman and Hussey, "George Bush and the Evangelicals: Religious Commitment and Partisan Change
Among Evangelical Protestants, 1964-2004," 180-84.

105

political progeny – the New Deal, the Great Society. Don’t blame society, he would repeat,
blame the sinner.”306 This stress on theological, moral, and political individualism translated to
economic individualism for many white evangelicals, and we observe a drift to the right on
economic issues. Through Reagan’s two terms in office, white evangelical opinion on fiscal
policy/social welfare moved toward convergence with GOP positions, as seen in Figures 4.4-4.8.
Perhaps “captivated” by Reagan’s moral and cultural conservatism, white evangelicals “tunedin” to his fiscally conservative agenda.
Given that white evangelicals are consistent moral conservatives – they exhibit
distinctively conservative attitudes on social issues after correcting for income, education, age
gender, and martial status – the rightward drift on fiscal policy is not entirely surprising.307 In
this light, white evangelicals simply followed the party that more closely approximated their
moral/social conservatism. Indeed, many group leaders began to advocate for “Christian
capitalism,” largely on the basis of Calvinist individualism, and took credit for Reagan’s
victories in 1980 and 1984.308
In fact, Jerry Falwell and other group leaders were so enamored with Reagan that they
refused to criticize his policies, despite several instances of disappointment.309 For example,
when Reagan appointed Sandra Day O’Connor, a known supporter of pro-choice policy from
Arizona, to the Supreme Court instead of the white evangelical preferred Phyllis Schlafly (the
famous conservative Catholic anti-ERA advocate), many expected a backlash from the white
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evangelical community. Yet Falwell, after briefly criticizing the President, came out in support
of Reagan’s choice. In an interview during the Senate’s confirmation hearing of O’Connor in
1981, Falwell said, “I am very happy with this President … [Reagan is] the greatest President
we’ve had in my lifetime and history may say the greatest President ever.”310 Falwell’s position
exemplifies the staunch support given to Reagan by white evangelical elites, and further helps to
clarify both the movement of white evangelicals into the Republican Party and the rightward
drift of white evangelical opinion on fiscal policy issues.
This is consistent with the idea that ideological reciprocity between group and party elites
contributed to the strongly pro-GOP rhetoric from white evangelical leaders. As I have shown,
many contemporary white evangelical leaders are outspoken advocates of a market-liberal
ideology and Christian capitalism. Although many political scientists and sociologists assume
that fiscal conservatism stems from evangelical theology, differences in biblical interpretation
over time render this assumption problematic.311 The notion that biblical interpretation can
change to serve political ends points to the conclusion that the white evangelical leaders’
outspoken advocacy of market-liberal ideology served a political purpose. Specifically, the
continued “symbiosis” between white evangelicals and the GOP contains an element of
ideological reciprocity. While socially conservative white evangelical leaders were not
necessarily predisposed to support fiscally conservative policies, they did (and still do) – and
provided theological backing to their positions citing Calvinist individualism – in order to gain
favor with GOP elites.
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Empirically, Guth, Green, Smidt, Kellstedt, and Poloma’s study of the politics of
Protestant clergy show that white evangelical clergy tend to take conservative stances on a wide
range of political issues, including fiscal policy.312 Because, as I have shown, there is no concrete
theological explanation for white evangelical fiscal conservatism, the fact that white evangelical
group leaders tend to exhibit ideological constraint contextualizes the notion of ideological
reciprocity. Furthermore, the authors find that not only did a majority of white evangelical clergy
polled identify as Republicans, but also that there has been a partisan realignment among
evangelical clergy in the last half-century, with many clergy members reporting to have
abandoned the Democratic Party.313 This fits with the notion of ideological reciprocity in that as
evangelical clergy moved into the GOP, they began advocating fiscally conservative preferences
to their congregations. Reichley echoes this sentiment, asserting that white evangelical leaders
“accepted without much question the full conservative package [of the GOP] on economic and
foreign policy issues.”314 As a result, these preferences, to some degree, trickled down from
church leaders to congregants.
This may be particularly important given the significance of evangelical clergy in
forming adherents’ political preferences. Political scientists Djupe and Gilbert study the political
influence of churches and argue that the “dominant opinion of the church” is instrumental in
forming church members’ political ideologies and opinions.315 The authors suggest that this is
particularly true of white evangelical churches, finding that over 85% of congregants agreed or
strongly agreed that church leaders were an important factor in their political decisions.316 This
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finding implies that clergy are highly persuasive in forming adherent’s political opinions, and
moreover helps to contextualize the importance of ideological reciprocity between white
evangelical leaders (clergy) and GOP elites.
On the flip side, GOP elites have become more conservative on social issues in order to
appease white evangelicals.317 This is evident in both the specific policy positions of Reagan,
Bush, and other GOP leaders as well as in party platform literature. For example, as I argued in
Chapter 3, Reagan both shifted positions on social issues and appointed prominent white
evangelicals to government posts, presumably as to attract socially conservative voters.318
Furthermore, an analysis of party platform literature demonstrates ideological reciprocity.
Through the 1970s and 1980s, the Republican Party platform noticeably moved to the right on
socio-moral issues. For instance, in 1972, there was no mention of abortion at all, and only three
mentions of abortion in the 1976 party platform.319 In 1980, however, abortion was mentioned
seven times, and additionally there was a section added on the importance of a “strong
family.”320 By 1988, the GOP platform included sections on abortion, strong family and strong
communities, and pornography.321 It becomes clear that as white evangelicals became widely
incorporated into the Republican Party, the Party began to advertise itself as socially and
sexually conservative. Although I do not suggest that the evolution of the GOP into the socially
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conservative Party is completely explained by the incorporation of white evangelicals, it is
possible as the Republican Party became outwardly socially conservative, white evangelicals,
especially at the elite level, drifted towards fiscal conservatism. The process defined by
ideological reciprocity continued through the 1980s, perhaps culminating with Pat Robertson’s
1988 presidential bid.
There is little doubt that by 1988, white evangelicals were a key constituency of the GOP
– the Reagan years proved as much.322 However, it was nonetheless a shock to the Republican
Party establishment when Pat Robertson, a noted born-again televangelist and white evangelical,
entered his name into the bidding for the Party’s nomination for president in 1988.323
Predictably, Robertson focused on social issues and a return to traditional morals in his initial
policy platform. However, in attempting to widen his base of support, Robertson advocated a
fiscally conservative ideology. While Robertson did not ignore the primary (socio-moral) policy
goals of the traditional white evangelical social conservative, he also promised many of the
fiscally conservative policies Reagan had never been able to enact. Specifically, Robertson
supported a “balanced budged amendment, a massive ‘across-the-board review’ of federal
spending, and attacked social welfare spending as misguided.”324 Robertson became a legitimate
contender for the bid, and thus helped to give white evangelicals a national political hero who
was both socially and fiscally conservative.325
Although Robertson finished a distant third in the nomination, his bid is important in
analyzing white evangelical fiscal policy/social welfare preferences. To begin with, Robertson
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continued Reagan’s legacy of connecting conservative religion with conservative politics and
conservative economics in the GOP. Undoubtedly a moral conservative, Robertson’s campaign
showed him to be an economic conservative as well, and one who was committed to the fiscal
restraint, tax cuts, and small government advocated by members of the secular right. At least in
part as a result of his adherence to moral traditionalism and cultural conservatism, white
evangelicals began to follow Robertson’s lead when it came to accepting the GOP establishment
on fiscal and foreign policy.326 See Table 4.1 for an analysis of the political attitudes of campaign
contributors to Robertson, Kemp, Bush, and Dole.
Table 4.1

Political Attitudes of 1988 Republican Presidential
Campaign Contributors
Extremely Conservative on:
Economic Policy
Defense Policy
Social Issues
!!
Strongly Agree:
Do Not Raise Taxes
No National Health Insurance
Childcare Not Gov't Responsibility
Mandatory School Prayer
Prohibit Abortion

Robertson

Kemp

Bush

Dole

25%
25
68

22%
20
26

10%
8
8

6%
3
6

!

!
61
46
58
43
85

!!

!
60
16
46
13
25

34
22
22
7
10

24
9
25
2
21

Source: Mail survey of contributors to presidential candidates conducted between December 1988 and May 1990 by
Clyde Wilcox, Clifford Brown, and Lynda Powell. Adapted from Wilcox, God’s Warriors: The Christian Right in
Twentieth-Century America: 173.

As we would expect, supporters of Robertson’s campaign were more conservative on social
issues than the supporters of the other main Republican candidates. However, Robertson’s
supporters were also more likely to be extremely conservative on economic policy than
supporters of Kemp (25%-22%), Bush (25%-10%), and Dole (25%-6%). This is consistent with
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the assertion that Robertson’s primarily white evangelical supporters adhered to the fiscal
conservatism of the GOP in addition to their unsurprising moral conservatism.
Furthermore, as Bendyna and Wilcox explain in their comparison of the Moral Majority
and the Christian Coalition, even after Robertson had left the race, his supporters continued to
“work behind the scenes to influence the Republican National Convention, and to gain a foothold
in state Republican Parties.”327 The successful foray into both local and national politics by
Robertson’s supporters continued and strengthened a trend of political tradeoffs between white
evangelical actors and secular GOP elites. In other words, white evangelicals penetrated state
Republican Parties, advocating social conservatism and religion in public life in exchange for
political capital – votes, money, and infrastructure. Also, Robertson’s endorsement of Bush after
leaving the race pushed many of his supporters towards the GOP status quo. According to
historian Donald Critchlow, this was key in shaping white evangelical attitudes towards nonsocial (economic and foreign policy) issues.328 Since Robertson’s failed presidential bid, which
in many ways crowned white evangelicals’ incorporation into the GOP, we have observed white
evangelicals taking consistently conservative positions on most issues.
Through the 1990s and into the 21st century, white evangelicals reinforced the trend that
began with Reagan and Robertson – affiliation with the GOP and conservative opinions on fiscal
policy and social welfare issues. For example, Figure 4.9 shows opinions on whether “we should
let the free market handle the economy,” or “the government should step in.” As we can see,
since 1990 white evangelicals are more apt to believe that the free market can handle the
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economy on its own. This is consistent with the hypothesis that as white evangelical partisanship
in the GOP increased, the group became more fiscally conservative.
Figure 4.9

We Should Let the Free Market Handle the Economy,
1990-2008
50.0%
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Source: American National Election Studies, 1990-2008

By 2008, white evangelicals exhibited consistently conservative opinions on fiscal policy
issues. As Wilcox and Robinson show, nearly 60% of white evangelicals in 2008 believed that
the government should not guarantee jobs, and over 50% opposed the national health plan. These
positions are similarly conservative to white mainline Protestants, and substantially more
conservative than white Catholics and whites with no religious affiliation.329 Perhaps most
strikingly, white evangelicals were more likely than other white religious groups to believe that
jobs are more important than the environment by a significant margin. This further illustrates
contemporary white evangelical fiscal conservatism. The authors’ analysis of 2008 survey data is
adapted in Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2

Select Issue Positions of White Religious Groups, 2008
Government Not Guarantee Job
Oppose National Health Care
Jobs More Important than Environment
Decrease Immigration

Evangelical
58%
51
57
54

Mainline
62%
43
31
52

Catholic
58%
44
26
46

No
Affiliation
51%
29
28
43

Source: American National Election Studies, 2008. Adapted from Wilcox and Robinson, Onward Christian
Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics: 63. Note that Wilcox and Robinson use the term
“Fundamentalist” to denote the most conservative; I use “Evangelical.”

There is little doubt that the fiscal policy attitudes of white evangelicals were less
ambiguous prior to the 1950s than they are today. Although it is impossible to discount entirely
the impact of both theology and socioeconomic status in explaining fiscally conservative
opinions of white evangelicals, it is important to note the problematic nature of each of these
explanations. Meanwhile, it is also important to consider party affiliation as a factor in
explaining white evangelical market-liberal ideology. A complete picture explanation of white
evangelical policy preferences would take into account all of the above explanations – both the
conventional wisdom and the effect of party affiliation and incorporation into the GOP.
I conclude this study by commenting on the key findings of this analysis. I will then
discuss journalistic treatments of white evangelicals, and examine on the biases therein. I will
further speculate on the future of white evangelicals in American politics, discussing recent
trends and contemplating the possibility of future party position change and its effect on white
evangelical opinion and political behavior.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
Key Findings
In the preceding chapters, I examine the dynamics of white evangelical politicization,
relationship to the GOP, and the effects of party affiliation on group opinion change. This work
contributes to the literature in two central ways. First, it looks to provide sociocultural context to
white evangelical political behavior while maintaining a focus on political institutions and public
opinion. Because much of the literature is grounded in interest group politics and/or social
movement theory, there is a tendency to treat white evangelicals reductionistically.330 As a
result, there is room for a treatment that instead emphasizes political institutions and public
opinion. I attempt to provide such an analysis.
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, I illuminate an irony of history with regards
to public opinion. I observe that a leftward drift of mass opinion on social and cultural issues
during the 1960s-1970s led, via partisan incorporation, to a rightward drift of white evangelical
opinion on fiscal policy and social welfare issues during the 1980s-1990s. The irony is that these
two phenomena seemingly reflect entirely separate political calculations. This provides the
opportunity to shed light on a relatively unexplained (or inadequately so) observation: a group
defined by biblical literalism and moral traditionalism exhibits distinctly conservative positions
on fiscal policy and social welfare issues.
In concluding, I will discuss the contemporary state of white evangelicals in American
politics. Specifically, I will consider journalistic predictions of the movement’s failure. I will
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then offer my own thoughts concerning the political future of white evangelicals with respect to
the possibility of new party coalitions and opinion formation and/or change.

White Evangelicals in the Media
Some scholars have argued that the Christian Right is destined to fail – retract into
relative political obscurity and cease to be a factor in national and state electoral politics.331 For
example, Bruce contends that the fragmented nature of the movement’s religious base (not all
evangelical denominations believe the same thing), the requisite differences between religious
thinking and political thinking (tradeoffs must be made and coalitions built for political success,
but many evangelicals may not be willing to marginalize religious beliefs), and institutional
barriers (for example, the difficulty of 3rd party formation in the US) ensure that the Christian
Right will “inevitably fail.”332 Yet Bruce’s conclusions suffer from observed history. In the
decades since Bruce published these theses, white evangelicals have remained central actors in
the American political arena. Not only did Ralph Reed bring the Christian Coalition to the
mainstream in the mid-1990s, but also George W. Bush won presidential elections in 2000 and
2004 with wide support from evangelicals.
Moreover, it is not just sociologists who have made erroneous predictions with regards to
white evangelicals – popular publications have also predicted that the group will politically fail.
For example, the historian and William Jennings Bryan biographer Michael Kazin argues in a
New Republic article that between American public opinion moving away from moral
traditionalism and a paucity of charismatic leaders, white evangelicals on the brink of political
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extinction.333 This sentiment is echoed by a recent article in The Atlantic, in which journalist
Jonathan Merritt argues that the 2012 election marks the end of evangelical “dominance” in
politics for three reasons: size, waning influence, and “wanting” leadership.334 Though
evangelicals make up roughly one-third of the electorate, Merritt suggests that this is not enough
to win elections. Rather, according to Merritt, even if 100% of evangelicals voted for Romney, it
may not have been enough for him to win the White House (approximately 80% did).
Furthermore, globalization and the digital age have marginalized the grassroots nature of
evangelical churches, and politically influential pastors have largely died. The New York Times
has chimed in as well, reporting after the 2012 election that evangelical leaders and churches no
longer have the influence they once did.335 Yet these prescriptions seem to be largely inadequate.
Though Merritt suggests otherwise, the nearly one-third of Americans who identify as
evangelicals (about 25% of which are white) represent an influential voting bloc. And, while
some scholars and pundits talk about a leftward movement of white evangelical opinion on some
social issues, notably gay marriage, others, such as abortion, have remained steady since the
early 1990s.336
Perhaps the most controversial journalistic account of white evangelicals belongs to
Thomas Frank and his What’s the Matter with Kansas. Frank argues that the Republican Party
has used “values” to “convince ordinary [white] Americans” to vote against their economic
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interests. Chief among these ordinary Americans are white evangelicals.337 Specifically, Frank
asserts, “Republicans have hijacked several legitimate, even honorable anti-intellectual
traditions. The first of these is Protestant evangelicalism.”338 As with his argument concerning
low-income whites, Frank suggests that white evangelicals have been persuaded by the GOP to
vote against their interests. Parallel to the problems with Frank’s more general thesis (see
footnote 344), the notion that Republicans have “hijacked” white evangelicals is problematic.
While the group essentially fits with Frank’s hypothesis – as I have shown white evangelicals do
care more about social issues than economic issues, have undergone a partisan realignment from
the Democratic to the Republican Party, and are relatively poorer than most American religious
groups – Frank glosses over an important point: white evangelicals seem to vote with their
interests. Of course, this depends on the definition of the word “interest.” I define it here as
meaning that white evangelicals have not been tricked by the Republican Party. Rather, white
evangelicals simply value conservative positions on social issues, and the GOP has become the
party of social conservatism. Given this, white evangelicals vote exactly with their interests – for
the candidates who more closely approximate their views on the issues that they care most about.
To suggest otherwise, as Frank does, paints a reductionist picture.
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This picture can be clarified by considering the future of white evangelicals in America.
Specifically, I reflect on party position change since the 2012 election as well as 2012 polling
data. I suggest that partisan movement on immigration may lead to large numbers of Latino
evangelicals moving into the Republican Party. If the theory presented in this paper is correct,
we expect that Latino evangelical opinion on economic issues would then begin to drift to the
right.

The Future of White Evangelicals in American Politics
The future of white evangelicals is an oft-discussed topic in religion and American
politics literature. Notably, evangelical constituencies are growing. As suggested in Chapter 1,
black and white evangelicalism in America developed into distinctly different religious sects, but
as numbers of Latino evangelicals in America increase, there may be reason to believe that the
evangelical issue agenda may change.339 According to the PEW Forum, Latino evangelicals
account for about 7.8 million voters – roughly 20% of the Latino vote. In the 2012 election,
Latino evangelicals preferred Obama to Romney 50%-39%, and are more likely to align
themselves with the GOP than other Latino religions. Latino evangelicals tend to be social
conservatives, and, for example, strongly oppose same-sex marriage (66% opposed, 25% favored
in a 2012 poll).340 Yet, Latino evangelicals are relatively more liberal on matters of political
economy. According to Luis Lugo, director of the PEW Forum on Religion and Public Life,
Latino evangelicals are “big government social conservatives.”341 This presents an interesting
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question – like white evangelicals in the 1970s, will the GOP, as the socially conservative party,
attempt to lure Latino evangelicals into their constituency? Perhaps they already have. Although
Latino evangelicals notably led prayers at both the DNC and the RNC during the 2012 election
season, GOP movement on immigration since the 2012 election might suggest that Latino
evangelicals will be more inclined to vote for Republican candidates in future elections.
According to Latino evangelical leader and President of the National Latino Evangelical
Coalition Gabriel Salguero, “After immigration, we still have work to do.”342 What this work
turns out to be will be key to future party position change.
The importance of Latino evangelicals and the possibility of GOP position change is
perhaps a microcosm of a larger shift in white evangelical political strategy. As Williams points
out, Southern Baptist leader Rick Warren – according to Time Magazine, America’s most
powerful religious leader and author of Purpose-Driven Life, the best-selling hardcover book in
American publishing history except the Bible – promotes a brand of evangelicalism that appeals
to a younger generation of adherents.343 Thus, Warren may epitomize the future of evangelical
politics: theological conservatism and moral traditionalism, but with a focus on new issues, such
as the environment and poverty, and an interest in bipartisanship. In fact, Warren reached out to
both party’s candidates in both 2008 and 2012, and, characteristically, addressed the Clinton
Global Initiative on Poverty while simultaneously campaigning against abortion and supporting a
California ballot initiative prohibiting same-sex marriage.344 This raises important questions:
Will white evangelicals stay largely GOP constituents? If Warren continues to strive towards
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bipartisanship, and is seen as having 30% of the electorate behind him, will we observe party
position change? If so, will white evangelical opinion on non-social issues change?
Though it is possible, this seems unlikely. As we know, white evangelicals tend to be
thorough moral conservatives, and history tells us that the group affiliates with the party that
more closely approximates this preference for moral traditionalism. It seems improbable that
white evangelicals would back off their mission to “restore” a Christian moral order to the
nation. That being said, it is noteworthy that recently younger generations of white evangelicals
are seemingly less politically conservative than the previous generation. See Table 5.1 for select
2012 issue positions of white evangelicals according to age. Because opinions seem to move to
leftward as age decreases, there may be reason to believe that party position change could occur
and, with it, a wide-scale partisan realignment.
Table 5.1

Select Issue Positions of White Evangelicals by Age, 2012
No abortion for any reason
Too much welfare
Too much protecting the environment
Too much spending on foreign aid
Strongly disagree: Homosexuals should
have the right to marry
Immigration should be reduced a lot

18-24
66.7%
36.4
9.1
60.1

25-34
81.3%
46.2
15.4
53.8

35-54
73.9%
54.0
21.2
81.1

55+
85.9%
49.3
21.7
85.7

11.1
14.3

18.8
23.1

46.4
48.6

56.7
46.4

Source: General Social Survey, 2012

Indeed, based on the arguments outlined in this paper, there is a theoretical possibility of
party position change and resultant white evangelical opinion change. Appealing to younger
evangelicals, group leaders like Warren may advocate moderate positions on issues such as the
environment and poverty, and thus push some white evangelicals towards the center. White
evangelicals will undoubtedly remain moral, cultural, and social conservatives. However, as
exemplified by Warren, many adherents’ opinions on non-social issues may be more fungible.
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Thus, party movement on foreign affairs, the environment, fiscal/social welfare policy, and
immigration might lead to group opinion change around these issues.345 That being said, minor
differences between age groups are unlikely to create sizeable changes in white evangelical
opinion or voting behavior. The effects of party polarization on moral issues, especially gay
marriage, abortion, and family policy, have set each party as firmly culturally conservative
(GOP) and culturally liberal (Democratic Party). At least in the foreseeable future, it seems
implausible that this would change. For example, despite general distrust of Mitt Romney due to
his Mormon faith and wealth, white evangelicals in fact turned out in 2012 in slightly higher
numbers than in 2008. This implies that, although Romney was likely not the group’s first choice
to run, the alternative – Obama’s steady cultural and social liberalism – was far worse.346
As a result, we expect to observe a continuation of the white evangelical-GOP status quo.
More likely than wide-scale party position change, we instead anticipate that the parties will
continue to attempt to expand, and, for example, as the GOP moves toward the center on
immigration policy, Latino evangelicals may enter the Republican coalition.
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Appendix 1: Wording of Survey Questions
Table 2.1: “Have you heard or read about the Equal Rights Amendment?” If yes, “Do you
strongly favor, somewhat favor, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose this amendment?”
Table 5.1:
ABORTION: “Please tell me whether or not think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to
obtain a legal abortion for any reason.”
WELFARE: “We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved
easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you
to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the
right amount of money on it.” Answer K. Welfare
ENVIRONMENT: “We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be
solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd
like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or
about the right amount of money on it.” Answer B. Improving and Protecting the Environment
FOREIGN AID: Environment: “We are faced with many problems in this country, none of
which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for
each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little
money, or about the right amount of money on it.” Answer J. Foreign Aid
HOMOSEXUAL MARRIAGE: “And what about a man who admits that he is homosexual …
Suppose this admitted homosexual wanted to get married. Should he be allowed to get married or
not?” Responses coded: “Yes, allowed; Not allowed; Don’t Know”
IMMIGRATION: “Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are
permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased a lot, increased a little, left the
same as it is now, decreased a little, or decreased a lot?”
Figure 2.1: Limited to “No” answers. “Please tell me whether or not you think it should be
possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion: A) If she is married and does not want
any more children? B) If the family is very low income and cannot afford any more children? C)
If she is not married and does not want to marry the man?”
Figure 2.2: Do you agree or disagree with this statement: Women should take care of running
their homes and leave running the country up to men.”
Figures 3.1-3.2, 3.6, 3.9-3.11:
PARTISANSHIP: “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican,
Democrat, Independent, or what? Would you call yourself a strong (REP/DEM) or a not very
strong (REP/DEM)? (IF INDEPENDENT, OTHER, OR NO PREFERENCE:) Do you think of
yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic Party?” Responses coded “Strong Democrat,
Weak Democrat, Independent – Democrat, Independent, Independent – Republican, Weak
Republican, and Strong Republican.”
RELIGION: Before 1992: ATTENDS/CONSIDERS SELF PROTESTANT: (IF BAPTIST:)
With which Baptist group is your church associated? Is it the Southern Baptist Convention, the
American Baptist Churches in the USA, the American Baptist Association, [1992-LATER: the
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National Baptist Convention U.S.A.,] an independent Baptist church or some other Baptist
group? (IF INDEPENDENT BAPTIST:) Are you affiliated with any larger Baptist group or is
this strictly a local church? (IF LUTHERAN:) Is this church part of the Evangelical Lutheran
Church in America, the Missouri Synod, or some other Lutheran group? (IF METHODIST:) Is
your church part of the United Methodist Church, African Methodist Episcopal, or some other
Methodist group? (IF PRESBYTERIAN:) Is this the Presbyterian Church in the USA or some
other Presbyterian group? (IF REFORMED:) Is this the Christian Reformed Church, the
Reformed Church in America, or some other Reformed group? (IF BRETHREN:) Is this the
Church of the Brethren, the Plymouth Brethren, or what? (IF CHRISTIAN OR JUST
CHRISTIAN:) When you say "Christian" does that mean the denomination called the "Christian
Church (Disciples of Christ)," or some other Christian denomination, or do you mean to say "I
am just a Christian?" (IF CHURCH OR CHURCHES OF CHRIST:) Is this the Church of Christ
or United Church of Christ? (IF CHURCH OF GOD:) Is this the Church of God of Anderson
Indiana, the Church of God of Cleveland Tennessee, the Church of God in Christ, or some other
Church of God? (IF HOLINESS OR PENTECOSTAL:) What kind of church is that? What is it
called exactly? Is that part of a larger church or denomination? What is that church called?
ATTENDS/CONSIDERS SELF OTHER: What is it called exactly? Is that church part of a
denomination? Is that group Christian?
AFTER 1992 AND CUMULATIVE DATA FILE: (IF R ATTENDS RELIGIOUS SERVICES:)
Do you mostly attend a place of worship that is Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, or what?
ATTENDS/CONSIDERS SELF PROTESTANT: ALL CHRISTIANS: Which one of these
words BEST describes your kind of Christianity: Fundamentalist, Evangelical, Charismatic or
Spirit-Filled, Moderate to Liberal? Would you call yourself a born-again Christian, that is, have
you personally had a conversion experience related to Jesus Christ? Responses coded “Mainline
Protestant, Evangelical Protestant, Black Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Non-traditional Orthodox,
Non-Christian/Non-Jewish, Atheist/Agnostic/None, and Don’t Know/No Answer.”
LOCATION: What region are you from? Responses coded: Northeast (CT, ME, MA, NH, NJ,
NY, PA, RI, VT), North Central (IL, IN, IA, KS, MI, MN, MO, NE, ND, OH, SD, WI), South
(AL, AR, DE, D.C., FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA, WV), West (AK,
AZ, CA, CO, HI, ID, MT, NV, NM, OR, UT, WA, WY).”
Figure 3.3: “Thinking about all the different kinds of governments in the world today, which of
these statements comes closest to how you feel about Communism as a form of government?
Responses coded: “It’s the worst kind of all; It’s bad but no worse than some others; It’s all right
for some countries; It’s a good form of government.”
Figure 3.4: “Some say that the civil rights people have been trying to push too fast. Others feel
they haven't pushed fast enough. Do you think that civil rights leaders are trying to push too fast,
are going too slowly, or are they moving about the right speed?” Responses coded: “Too Slowly;
About Right; Too Fast; Depends/Other.”
Figure 3.5: “Are you in favor of desegregation, strict segregation, or something in between?”
Figure 3.7: What region are you from? Responses coded: Northeast (CT, ME, MA, NH, NJ, NY,
PA, RI, VT), North Central (IL, IN, IA, KS, MI, MN, MO, NE, ND, OH, SD, WI), South (AL,
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AR, DE, D.C., FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA, WV), West (AK, AZ,
CA, CO, HI, ID, MT, NV, NM, OR, UT, WA, WY).” Used for all geographic analyses.
Figure 4.2: “You might agree to some extent with both, but we want to know which one is closer
to your views: One, we need a strong government to handle today's complex economic problems;
or two, the free market can handle these problems without government being involved.”
Responses coded “Strong Government; Free Market; Don’t Know/Depends.”
INCOME: “Please look at this card/page and tell me the letter of the income group that includes
the income of all members of your family living here in [previous year] before taxes. This figure
should include salaries, wages, pensions, dividends, interest, and all other income.” Responses
coded on a 5 point percentile scale (0-16, 17-33, 34-67, 68-95, 96-100 percentile). Recoded to
form thirds: 0-33, 34-67, 68-100 percentile)
Figure 4.3: “Do you think the government is too powerful or do you think the government is not
getting too strong?”
INCOME: “Please look at this card/page and tell me the letter of the income group that includes
the income of all members of your family living here in [previous year] before taxes. This figure
should include salaries, wages, pensions, dividends, interest, and all other income.” Responses
coded on a 5 point percentile scale (0-16, 17-33, 34-67, 68-95, 96-100 percentile). Recoded to
form thirds: 0-33, 34-67, 68-100 percentile)
Figure 4.4:
BEFORE 1968: “Some say the government in Washington ought to help people get doctors and
hospital care at low cost; others say the government should not get into this. Have you been
interested enough in this to favor one side over the other? (IF YES) What is your position?”
Responses coded: “Opinion: help people get doctors and hospital care at a low cost; Opinion:
government should stay out of this; and Don’t know”
AFTER 1968: “Some people feel there should be a government insurance plan which would
cover all medical and hospital expenses for everyone. Others feel that medical expenses should
be paid by individuals and through private insurance. Where would you place yourself on this
scale?” Responses coded on a 7-point scale, with 1 being government insurance plan and 7 being
completely private insurance plan. Responses 5 through 7 recoded to “Government Should Stay
Out Providing Assistance With Medical Care.”
Figure 4.5:
BEFORE 1968: “Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every
person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think the government should just let each
person get ahead on their own. Which is closer to the way you feel?” Responses coded:
“Government should see to it that all people have a job and a good standard of living;
Government should let each person get ahead on his own; and Don’t know.”
AFTER 1968: “Some people feel that the government in Washington should see to it that every
person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think the government should just let each
person get ahead on his/their own. Where would you place yourself on this scale?” Responses
coded on a 7-point scale, with 1 being government guarantee job and 7 being government let
each person get ahead on his own. Responses 5 through 7 recoded as “Government Should Let
Each Person Get Ahead on Their Own (Jobs).”
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Figure 4.6: “Some people think that the government in Washington ought to reduce the income
differences between the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families or by
giving income assistance to the poor. Others think that the government should not concern itself
with reducing this income difference between the rich and the poor. Here is a card with a scale
from 1 to 7. Think of a score of 1 as meaning that the government ought to reduce the income
between rich and poor. and a score of 7 meaning that the government should not concern itself
with reducing: income differences. What score between 1 and 7 comes closest to the way you
feel?” Note: Responses 5-7 recoded as “Government Should Not Reduce Income Differences.”
Figure 4.7: “Some people think that the government in Washington is trying to do too many
things that should be left to individuals and private businesses. Others disagree and think that the
government should do even more to solve our country's problems. Still others have opinions
somewhere in between. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you made up
your mind on this?” Note: Responses given on a 5-point scale. Responses 4-5 recoded as
“Government Does Too Much.”
Figure 4.8: “Some people think that the government in Washington should do everything
possible to improve the standard of living of all poor Americans. Other people think it is not the
government's responsibility, and that each person should take care of himself. Note: Responses
given on a 5-point scale. Responses 4-5 recoded as “People Should Help Themselves Improve
Their Standard of Living.”
Figure 4.9: “You might agree to some extent with both, but we want to know which one is closer
to your views: One, we need a strong government to handle today's complex economic problems;
or two, the free market can handle these problems without government being involved.” Answers
coded: Strong Government, Free Market, or Don’t Know/Depends.
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